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Robinson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurnace Co.12/28/2000
when it does not. Trial courts routinely take the words of this Court to mean what they say, whether articulated in a summary judgment proceeding or otherwise. A typical function of summary judgment proceedings is to outline the elements that must be proved at trial. The approach adopted by this Court now leaves any body of law developed in summary judgment decisions in doubt. This is a dramatic change in the Court's jurisprudence.
The Court also appears to treat the pronouncement of its earlier cases as dicta. Another set of problems arise. The bad faith cause of action is a judicial creation. That happens in the development of the common law. But when the Court recognizes a new cause of action, the Court's outline of elements of the cause of action should be weighed heavily, not disregarded lightly. The Court in White recognized the bad faith cause of action and subsequent cases have outlined the elements of that cause. The decision in this case is not a clarification, as characterized by the Court. It is a change and should be called such.
The reliance of the Court on Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington Insurance Company, 133 Idaho 249, 256, 985 P.2d 674, 682 (1999), is misplaced. The issue of the burden of proof concerning fairly debatable claims was not addressed. There is no basis to extrapolate any approval of shifting the burden to the insurance company to prove a claim was fairly debatable. Inland does not speak to the question either in the case before this Court or in the district court where it was tried. In the thirty-four jury instructions that were given, only one, instruction number 21, mentioned the concept of "fairly debatable," and that instruction did not address the burden of proof. For whatever reason, the issue of burden of proof was not argued in Inland. Bootstrapping a ruling when there was none is, again, a departure from our jurisprudence.
The Court can change the law and overrule precedent when it believes there is a good reason to do so. No such reason has been demonstrated in this case. The idea that there is a great hurdle in having to prove the negative in these actions is unrealistic. The plaintiff merely has to show the nature of the claim and that the claim is covered by the policy to make a prima facie case. There is nothing that indicates that the requirement has created burdens demanding change. Frankly, it is doubtful that placing the burden one place or another makes much difference in this or similar cases. What is important is that this Court not embark on an ad hoc analysis that leaves in doubt the state of the law developed in summary judgment proceedings.
In sum, the Court has changed the rules without a compelling basis to do so, and in doing so has cast a question on the interpretation of prior case authority articulated in summary judgment proceedings.
The Court has ruled that it is not necessary to prove coverage under the policy for an insured to recover on a bad faith claim. It should be taken as a matter of law that if there is no coverage the claim is fairly debatable. However, as formulated, the Court's decision can be read to allow recovery even if there is no coverage, despite the fact that lack of coverage should render the claim fairly debatable.
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