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Stone v. North Star Steel Company3/14/2003
JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Remanded.
. Plaintiff-appellant Scott Stone appeals from the judgment of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court dismissing his complaint against defendants-appellees North Star Steel Company ("North Star") and Mastership Corporation ("Mastership"). This court is asked to decide three issues. First, this court must decide whether an employer intentional tort cause of action is substantially similar to a negligence cause of action for purposes of the saving statute. Second, we must decide whether R.C. 4123.74, a workers' compensation statute, bars a third-party-beneficiary contract claim. Last, this court is asked to determine whether Stone raised an actionable negligence cause of action against Mastership. For the reasons stated below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
FACTS
. Mastership is a professional employer organization that hires and places workers at the work sites of various clients. North Star is one of Mastership's clients. Stone interviewed with both North Star and Mastership and was placed as a millwright at North Star. On February 10, 2000, Stone was injured on the job . Stone allegedly fell through an unguarded furnace platform and sustained injuries.
. On June 29, 2000, Stone filed a cause of action against North Star that sounded in negligence ("Stone I"). Stone later amended the complaint, naming Mastership as an additional defendant and an intentional tort cause of action against Mastership. On January 24, 2002, Stone moved to amend his complaint for the second time. The effect of the second amended complaint was to transpose the causes of action. Stone wished to allege an intentional tort cause of action against North Star and a negligence cause of action against Mastership. Stone also wished to add a third-party-beneficiary contract claim against North Star.
. On February 25, 2002, before the trial court had the opportunity to rule on the motion to amend the complaint, Stone voluntarily dismissed the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 41. On that same day, Stone filed another action against North Star and Mastership, ("Stone II"). This complaint alleged that North Star committed an intentional tort and breached a contract and that Mastership was liable for negligence. In effect, this complaint did exactly what the second amended complaint would have done. In response to the complaint, North Star and Mastership filed motions to dismiss based on Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
. The trial court held that the intentional tort claim was barred by the statute of limitations and that the saving clause, R.C. 2305.19, did not apply. The trial court held that a third-party-beneficiary contract claim was barred by the immunity provided in R.C. 4123.74, the workers' compensation statute. Additionally, the trial court held that the negligence claims asserted against Mastership failed to show a cause of actionable negligence. The complaint was dismissed. Stone timely appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
. Stone raises one assignment of error, which contends:
. "The trial court erred in granting defendant-appellees' motions to dismiss in its 5/30/02 judgment entry."
. An appellate court reviews a motion to dismiss de novo. Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Constr., Inc. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 230. Dismissal of a claim pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate only where it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. In Defense of Deer v. Cleveland Metroparks (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 153, 160, citing O'
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