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Griffith v. Wausau Business Insurance Co.3/4/2003
r 14, 1999.
.Wausau appeals, assigning the following errors:
."1. The trial court erred to the prejudice of Defendant-Appellant Wausau Business Insurance Company in denying its motion for summary judgment and in granting Plaintiffs-Appellees' motion for summary judgment.
."2. The trial court erred to the prejudice of Defendant-Appellant Wausau Business Insurance Company in granting Plaintiffs prejudgment interest on the jury's verdict from the date of the accident."
.In its first assignment of error, Wausau asserts the trial court erred in determining, by way of summary judgment, that plaintiffs were entitled to UIM coverage under Wausau's business automobile policy issued to Granville, plaintiff's employer.
.Appellate review of summary judgments is de novo, under which the appellate court stands in the shoes of the trial court and conducts an independent review of the record. Advanced Analytics Laboratories v. Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, 148 Ohio App.3d 440, 2002-Ohio-3328, at . Summary judgment is proper only where the moving party demonstrates: (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in its favor. Civ.R. 56; State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183.
.Wausau acknowledges the policy language at issue in Scott-Pontzer and Ezawa is the same language used in Wausau's policy with Granville. However, Wausau asserts the policies in Scott-Pontzer and Ezawa are factually distinguishable from the policy at issue in this case: the policies in Scott-Pontzer and Ezawa were issued to private corporations, while the Wausau policy was issued to a public school district. Wausau asserts that, unlike a private corporation, a board of education has limited authority to enter into any contractual agreement, including the purchase of insurance. Wausau points to R.C. 3313.201 and 3327.09, contending a school district's authority to purchase UIM coverage is strictly limited to the authority expressly granted in those statutes. Wausau further contends that although a school district is permitted to insure an employee, R.C. 2744.01(B) defines an "employee" of a political subdivision, such as a board of education for a school district, as an employee acting within the scope of employment. Wausau maintains that since plaintiff was not acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, she was not an "employee" of Granville and thus neither she nor her husband are insureds under Granville's policy with Wausau.
.In Scott-Pontzer, plaintiff's decedent, who was not in the course of his employment, died as a result of an automobile accident that occurred while he was driving his spouse's automobile. The Supreme Court addressed whether the decedent was an insured under his employer's commercial automobile liability insurance policy, which contained a provision for UIM coverage. The declarations page of the policy named the employer corporation as the named insured. Construing language in the policy that defines an "insured" for purposes of UIM coverage, which is identical to that used in the Wausau policy, the Supreme Court held that employees of the corporation were "insureds" under the policy for purposes of UIM coverage. The Supreme Court further held the employees were entitled to UIM coverage under the policy regardless of whether the employees were acting within the scope of their employmen
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