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Brunet v. Avondale Industries12/5/2000
nal disease alleged to have been caused by asbestos is under the workers' compensation scheme.
Because we find this issue case determinative, the remaining assignments of error are pretermitted and will not be considered by this court. Accordingly, though for different reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. McMANUS, J., RESPECTFULLY DISSENTS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. For the following reasons, I would affirm in part, reverse in part, and amend the judgment of the trial court.
Brunet's Appeal
In the first assignment of error, Brunet alleges that the trial court erred by not entering judgment in his favor and against Avondale. Brunet alleges that the trial court erred by not giving the jury an instruction on the issue of Avondale's strict liability. The trial judge held that the instruction was not warranted as Brunet had not carried his burden of proving strict liability on the part of Avondale.
Strict liability is defined under LSA-C.C. art. 2317, which states in part:
"We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody."
While the 1996 Tort Revision changed strict liability law and added LSA-C.C. art. 2317.1, the pre-revision law applies in this case because Brunet's cause of action accrued during the time that he worked at Avondale from 1950-1978. The Supreme Court has held that the key relevant events giving rise to a claim in long-latency occupational disease cases such as this are the repeated tortious exposures resulting in continuous, on-going damages, although the disease may not be considered contracted or manifested until later. Under this interpretation of the law, Brunet's cause of action accrued while working at Avondale and the law in effect at the time of the accrual is the law which must be applied in this case, regardless of when the disease was actually discovered or when the petition was actually filed.
An owner's liability for a vice or defect on the premises is rooted in LSA-C.C. arts. 2317 and 2322. Both articles impose strict liability, or liability without fault, based upon status as an owner or custodian rather than on personal fault.
To recover under LSA-C.C. art. 2317, a plaintiff must prove that he was injured by a thing which was in the care or custody of the defendant and that such thing was defective. Strict liability requires the plaintiff to prove that the vice or defect of the thing is a condition which poses an unreasonable risk of harm to others. There is an irrebuttable presumption that the custodian had knowledge of the defective condition. Once the plaintiff has established a defect and custody, the only defenses available are the fault of the victim, the fault of a third person, or causation by irresistible force.
Because the decision as to whether a thing creates an unreasonable risk of harm is a legal question, the Court owes no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court. Appellate review regarding questions of law is simply review of whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect.
The issue of whether or not Avondale is strictly liable to Brunet is a question which must be limited to the facts of this case. Justice and social utility must serve as guideposts and moral, social and economic values must be considered in determination of whether the risk of harm is unreasonable. Claims and interests should be balanced, risk and gravity of harm should be weighed, and individu
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