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Barker v. Roelke3/20/2003
tion that Jackie Jay was not competent to act for herself as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident. Jackie Jay filed an amended pleading on or about September 19, 1997, which added a claim against appellant concerning the $400,000 which the trial court apportioned to him after the April 3, 1997, hearing. Jackie Jay alleged that appellant breached a duty which he purportedly owed to her as another wrongful death beneficiary by not including her as a party to his action against the Roelkes. Jackie Jay's pleading also sought to restrain appellant's use of the $400,000 he received on July 2, 1997, during the pendency of the case.
Jackie Jay filed a subsequent pleading on May 24, 1999, which greatly expanded the scope of the action. This amended pleading added several additional parties including: (1) appellant's attorney and his law firm; (2) the Roelkes' attorney and their law firm; (3) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company; (4) State Farm Fire & Casualty Company; and (5) the executors of the estate James Michael Thompson, Deceased. Jackie Jay alleged that these parties were aware of her lack of capacity and that they conspired to prevent her from receiving any portion of the insurance proceeds which were paid to appellant and Ronald Jay.
Jackie Jay ultimately reached a settlement with the Roelkes, their attorneys, and their insurers in March of 2000. Jackie Jay received the sum of $5,500,000 under the terms of the settlement agreement in consideration for her release of all of the claims she potentially possessed against the Roelkes, their attorneys, and their insurers. Jackie Jay's receipt of $5,500,000 under the terms of the subsequent settlement is the impetus for this appeal. Appellant amended his pleadings in March of 2000 to include claims seeking to rescind the written releases he executed in 1997 in favor of the Roelkes and their representatives. He directed his initial claim for rescission against only the Roelkes. Appellant later added State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire & Casualty Company as parties in April of 2000. Appellant asserted that he was entitled to rescission based on several grounds. He also pursued claims of conversion, breach of contract, fraud, and civil conspiracy against appellees (the Roelkes, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and State Farm Fire & Casualty Company).
Appellees filed traditional motions for summary judgment which urged that all of appellant's claims were barred by the releases he executed. The motions additionally asserted that appellant was precluded from seeking to rescind the releases under the theories of ratification and waiver. The trial court granted summary judgment for appellees on all claims asserted against them by appellant. Appellant brings a single appellate issue complaining that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. He has briefed seven sub-issues outlining his grounds for attacking the summary judgment. We affirm.
The trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the grounds upon which it is based. When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied upon for its ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the summary judgment grounds advanced by the movant are meritorious. Dow Chemical Company v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex.2001); Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.1989). With respect to a motion for traditional summary judgment, the question is whether the movant has met its burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that judgment should be granted as a matter of law. N
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