 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Chaney v. Corona2/28/2003
REVERSED AND RENDERED
Thalia Chaney ("Chaney") appeals the trial court's order denying her motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of immunity. Chaney contends the trial court erred by: (1) denying Chaney's motion to strike certain evidence presented in response to her motion for summary judgment; (2) denying Chaney's no-evidence motion for summary judgment; and (3) denying Chaney's traditional motion for summary judgment based on assertions of official immunity and immunity under the Texas Family Code and the Texas Education Code. In this accelerated appeal, we do not have jurisdiction to address Chaney's second issue because it is not based on an assertion of immunity. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. ยง 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
Background
A student's parent reported that the student's teacher, Diane Pearl Corona ("Corona"), hit the student in the eye with a chair. Chaney, the principal of the school, reported the incident to Ed Paschal, the Executive Director of Pupil Personnel, who instructed Chaney to interview the student. Chaney reported the allegations made during her interview of the student to her supervisor and was instructed to interview a few other students in the class. Chaney later was instructed to report the incident to Child Protective Services.
Eventually, the student sued Corona for personal injury . Corona filed a counter-claim against the student and a third party claim against Chaney. The suit against Corona was settled, and the counter- claim against the student was dismissed; however, Corona pursued claims for defamation and conspiracy against Chaney. Chaney's answer asserted immunity as an affirmative defense. Chaney moved for both a traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. Chaney filed this accelerated appeal after her motion was denied.
Standard of Review
The only issues we have jurisdiction to consider in this appeal relate to the trial court's denial of Chaney's summary judgment based on her assertions of immunity - an affirmative defense. Because Chaney has the burden of proof with regard to her affirmative defenses, a no- evidence motion for summary judgment is not proper; therefore, we only consider whether the trial court erred in denying the motion under traditional summary judgment standards. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (providing that party may move for summary judgment on ground that no evidence exists on one or more elements of claim or defense adverse party has burden to prove at trial); see also Harrill v. A.J.'s Wrecker Serv., Inc., 27 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.); Moritz v. Bueche, 980 S.W.2d 849, 856 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
"When reviewing a summary judgment, we follow these well-established rules: (1) The movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the non-movant." American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). "Summary judgment is proper if the defendant establishes all elements of an affirmative defense to each claim." Id. "Once a movant establishes its right to summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense, the non-movant must respond with reasons for avoiding summary judgment and must support those reasons with proof sufficient to raise a fact issue." Deaver v. Bridges, 47 S.W.3d 549, 551 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.).
Page 1 2 3 Texas Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|