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Freeburger v. Bichell12/26/2000
child, it does not go beyond that to alter the common law by creating a separate and concomitant cause of action in the parent of the adult child. As we see it, the primary purpose of FL § 13-102(b) is the same as the primary purpose of FL § 13-102(a), as recognized by this Court in Blucher: to remove from public support destitute and disabled people whose relatives are financially able to support them. Blucher, 68 Md. App. at 464. See also Lasley v. Georgetown Univ., 842 F. Supp. 593 (D. D.C. 1994).
Mr. Freeburger maintains that Smith v. Smith, supra, 227 Md. 355, supports his position. He emphasizes that in that case, the Court observed that the statutory predecessor to FL § 13-102(b) was "a clear indication of legislative intent to place failure to support an incapacitated [adult] child on equal footing with failure to support a minor child." Id. at 360. Smith did not involve the issue of liability to third parties, however. It dealt only with a parent's duty to support his or her destitute adult child. To be sure, when the parent is financially able, FL § 13-102(b) imposes such a duty of support, and the duty is on a par with the parental duty to support a minor child. It does not logically follow from the existence of that duty, however, that a parent who is obligated by statute to support his or her destitute adult child has a corresponding right of action against the tortfeasor responsible for the adult child's injuries. Indeed, such an interpretation would be an unwarranted extension of the law that is beyond the legislative scope and purpose of FL § 13-102(b).
Mr. Freeburger also argues that Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Pepper, supra, 346 Md. 679, supports his argument. We disagree. In Pepper, the Court of Appeals affirmed this Court and held that the duty imposed by FL § 13-102(b) does not preclude a minor child from recovering future medical expenses in his own name. In the case sub judice, by contrast, Michael was an adult child when the accident in which he was injured occurred. He had a cause of action against the appellees as the tortfeasors responsible for his injuries, and he asserted claims against them on that basis. He then voluntarily entered into a settlement of those claims, in which he released his cause of action. In an ideal world, the appellees would have had sufficient assets, whether in the form of insurance coverage or otherwise, to compensate Michael for, inter alia, the cost of his past, present, and future medical expenses. The fact that their assets were limited, however, means only that this case is like the many others in which injured people settle their claims for a compromised sum. It does not mean that a cause of action arose in favor of Michael's father for the same medical expenses that Michael had sought to recover.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
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