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McCoy v. Hatmaker12/26/2000
Q: Well, when was the first time you heard the term grossly negligent?
A: Today.
Q: In this deposition?
A: Yes.
Q: So prior to Mr. Winkelman putting that question to you in this deposition, you had never heard that term used before?
A: No.
Q: What do you understand as to the meaning of that term under Maryland law?
[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: Objection. Calls for a legal conclusion. You can answer.
A: I am not a lawyer.
Q: Does that mean you have no understanding of what it means?
A: I have no understanding. Yes.
Even Dworkin, appellant's emergency services expert, whose affidavit affirmed gross negligence, testified that Hatmaker had simply erred:
Q: Is it your opinion in this case that Paramedic Hatmaker simply made an error or a mistake in failing to initiate life-saving measures in - in pronouncing Mr. McCoy dead?
A: That's my opinion, yes.
Such equivocal testimony draws the case sub judice even more tightly into the realm of Tatum. See Tatum, 80 Md. App. at 568-69 (upholding dismissal of claims against county under Good Samaritan Act because plaintiff's own expert failed to testify that any of EMTs actions constituted reckless disregard for human life).
Finally, appellant implies that discrepancies regarding the timing of Hatmaker's arrival on the scene create a triable issue of fact. Seeking to shorten the time between McCoy's cardiac arrest and Hatmaker's arrival, she crafts her rendition of the facts to omit any mention of the original ambulance call, during which Medic 5 went to the wrong location. Both Officer Schwaab and Hatmaker testified at deposition that the ambulance had been misdirected, and we thus find appellant's representation of the timing of events to be disingenuous at best. When all the facts are presented, appellant can do nothing more than baldly allege that Hatmaker acted with reckless and wanton disregard for McCoy's life. Such allegations would not defeat appellees' motion for summary judgment, for neither bald assertions nor the existence of some alleged factual dispute will defeat a properly supported motion like the one sub judice. See Barber v. Eastern Karting Co., 108 Md. App. 659, 672, 673 A.2d 744 (1996); Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md. App. 236, 243, 603 A.2d 1357 (1992).
B.
Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred in granting Officer Schwaab's motion for summary judgment. As a member of the Baltimore City Police Department, Officer Schwaab has been trained as a first responder, subject to first responder protocols set forth in J. David Bergeron & Gloria Bizjak, Brady First Responder (5th ed.). According to Brady, first responders who are on duty must assist any patients they find according to their departments' standard operating procedures. In Baltimore, police officers who arrive on the scene of a distressed patient before more specialized medical personnel arrive must start CPR. Officer Schwaab is also certified as an EMT and subject, like Hatmaker, to MIEMSS protocols.
In his deposition testimony, Officer Schwaab acknowledged his duty to begin CPR when he reached the scene, and indeed he brought with him a personal resuscitation mask for that purpose. Yet, as he explained, the arrival of Fire Department personnel coincided with his own arrival and he left the job for others to do:
Q: I believe you said once you got there it was almost immediate that you saw the Fire Department and the paramedics?
A: Right.
Q: If they hadn't been there immediately an
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