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Shepherd v. Smith2/28/2003
ircumstances presented by the case justified an exception to the general rule, and we stated the following:
When, as here, A and B are sued jointly for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by their independent but concurring negligence, and the great preponderance of the evidence tends to show that A was, and B was not, guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the injuries, if the jury returns a verdict against B alone for a sum plainly greatly less than would appear to be a reasonable compensation for the injuries which the uncontradicted evidence shows the plaintiff suffered, the smallness of the verdict casts serious suspicion on the integrity of the finding by the jury that B was liable. Particularly is this true where, as in this case, the plaintiff's counsel in his argument invited and urged the jury to exculpate A and fix the whole blame on B for the manifest purpose of escaping the possible imputation of A's negligence to his client. Id. at 596, 175 S.E. at 240.
We considered the issue again in the case of Short v. Long. This case involved a collision between an automobile and a truck wherein the driver of the automobile sued for personal injuries. The truck driver denied negligence, asserted contributory negligence, and counter-claimed for his own personal injuries and property damage to his truck. The jury denied a recovery to the plaintiff, Short, and awarded the defendant, Long, $400 in damages on his counter-claim. Short, 197 Va. at 105, 87 S.E.2d at 777.
Among other assignments of error, Short argued that the trial court erred by not setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial because
he verdict of $400 is so inadequate and disproportionate to the damages proved by Long as to show that the jury ignored the court's instructions and did not make a finding upon the issue of whose negligence caused the collision but undertook to apportion the damages between the parties without consideration of liability. Id.
We stated that there was "credible evidence to support either litigant's version" of how the collision occurred and further stated that it was within the jury's province to determine the question of each party's negligence. Id. at 109, 87 S.E.2d at 780. Upon the question whether Short could complain of an inadequate verdict in favor of Long, we cited Miles for the general rule and further stated that in Miles "there were unusual circumstances that prompted the Court" to create the exception to the general rule. Id. at 110, 87 S.E.2d at 780. Finding no such "unusual circumstances," we affirmed the judgment in favor of Long. Id. at 111, 87 S.E.2d at 780.
In the case before us, it is readily apparent that the trial court, upon the urging of Smith, transmuted the narrow exception recognized in Miles into a general rule. In doing so, the trial court erred.
Smith cites a series of cases which she contends support her position that a defendant has the right to have a verdict set aside and a new trial ordered when a plaintiff's verdict is inadequate. What Smith fails to recognize is that each of the cases cited involves a plaintiff's request to set aside a plaintiff's verdict on the grounds that it was inadequate. None of the cases remotely stands for the proposition that a defendant may complain of a plaintiff's inadequate jury award.
Today, we reiterate that absent unusual circumstances such as those we found in Miles, in an ordinary and usual action in tort, the trial court may not set aside a verdict and order a new trial based upon a motion by the defendant claiming that the verdict for the plaintiff was inadequate. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment order dated Mar
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