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Harmon v. Wilson3/17/2003
John Harmon argues the King County Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant Brent and Karen Wilson's petition for reinstatement of their right to receive a deed at the expiration of their lease with Harmon. Harmon contends the issue had to be resolved by arbitration under the arbitration clause in the lease. The Wilsons raise numerous issues about the motions and procedures in the trial court. Because we affirm on the ground that Harmon waived his objection to the court's jurisdiction, we affirm without reaching those issues. We also award the Wilsons attorney fees on appeal as the prevailing party.
FACTS
In January 1994, Harmon and the Wilsons entered into a 10-year lease agreement for an adult-care residence. Harmon leased the property to the Wilsons to house assisted living residents. The lease provided that the Wilsons were entitled to receive a deed to the property from Harmon at the end of the lease term. Paragraph 16 of the lease provides that '{d}isputes between Lessor and Lessee relating to this Lease shall be arbitrated.' In April 2001, Harmon brought an unlawful detainer action against the Wilsons for alleged defaults under the lease. There was an arbitration hearing on September 10, 2001 and October 12, 2001. The arbitrator dismissed Harmon's unlawful detainer claim. But he also ruled that the Wilsons had lost their right to purchase the property because of their repeated failure to pay the rent on time. He found that the lease was not an equitable mortgage, and Harmon was entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party. He also ruled that, under the arbitration clause, only the superior court had authority to determine the amount of the fees. Harmon brought a motion in King County Superior Court to confirm the arbitrator's award under RCW 7.04.150 and for an award of attorney fees. The superior court signed an order confirming the arbitrator's award and awarding Harmon more than $14,000 in attorney fees.
The Wilsons petitioned the superior court under RCW 59.12.190 for an order reinstating their right to receive a deed at the expiration of the lease. Harmon opposed the Wilsons' petition for relief from forfeiture, but did not make the argument he makes here: that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the matter had to be resolved under the lease's arbitration clause. The trial court granted the Wilsons' petition and entered an order reinstating the deed term of the lease. The court ordered Harmon to deliver a statutory warranty deed to the Wilsons for the leased property provided they pay the attorney fees within six months, pay rent within 30 days of the due date from that time forward, and comply with all other terms of the lease. The Wilsons satisfied these conditions.
Harmon moved for reconsideration of the reinstatement order. Again, he did not argue that the court lacked jurisdiction because the arbitration clause required that the matter be arbitrated. The court denied his motion and confirmed the reinstatement order.
Harmon then appealed the reinstatement order to this court. His appeal was filed after the appeal period ran, and on July 26, 2002, a panel of this court dismissed the appeal as untimely. Harmon then brought a CR 60(b)(5) motion in superior court to vacate the reinstatement order, arguing for the first time that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the lease because the arbitration clause required that all disputes relating to the lease be arbitrated. The superior court denied this motion and Harmon's motion for reconsideration of that order. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Harmon argues the superior court improperly heard
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