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Smith v. CIGNA Healthplan of Arizona7/30/2002
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Appellant Sandra Smith, M.D., sued appellees, CIGNA HealthPlan of Arizona, Mitchell Hall, and Gilbert Burkel (collectively, "CIGNA") for tortious interference with her employment and wrongful discharge. The trial court granted CIGNA's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Smith's claim was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. ยงยง 141 through 187 (the Act). Smith appeals that ruling. Because we conclude the present record establishes that Smith was a supervisor in her position with CIGNA, her claim is not preempted, and we reverse the trial court's judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In reviewing a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we view the facts and inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Link v. Pima County, 193 Ariz. 336, , 972 P.2d 669, (App. 1998). CIGNA hired Smith as a physician in September 1993 and promoted her to the position of chief of staff of one of its facilities in 1994. CIGNA terminated Smith's employment in October 1995.
In March 1996, Smith filed a claim with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that CIGNA had discharged her in violation of the Act for engaging in protected activity. She alleged that, while working for CIGNA, she had met with other CIGNA physicians "to discuss various issues relevant to working conditions," and CIGNA executives had reprimanded her for organizing the meeting. Smith also alleged that she had voiced concern to other CIGNA physicians about alleged financial mismanagement by CIGNA administrators and that, in response, a CIGNA executive had "severely criticized" her and the other physicians. According to Smith, CIGNA thereafter terminated her employment under the pretext of a staff reduction when "the true motive . . . to remove Dr. Smith so she could not continue her protected concerted activity [under the Act] in organizing medical providers to improve their working conditions."
In its position statement to the NLRB, CIGNA argued that Smith's claim was precluded because, in her employment with CIGNA, she "was a supervisory or managerial employee not entitled to protection" of the Act. CIGNA also claimed that the reasons for her termination were not pretextual, but rather, that she had been terminated "due to a reduction in force and consequent job elimination which had nothing to do with any alleged protected concerted activity."
The NLRB regional director denied Smith's claim and refused to issue a complaint against CIGNA, and Smith appealed. In affirming the denial, the NLRB Office of Appeal stated that, " part from the issue of whether Dr. Smith was a 'supervisor' within the meaning of [the Act], . . . there was insufficient evidence to establish that" CIGNA had violated the Act, adding that "the evidence failed to indicate . . . the need for cost reduction was a pretext" for Smith's discharge.
Thereafter, Smith sued CIGNA in Pima County Superior Court, claiming that she had been wrongfully discharged and that appellees Hall and Burkel had tortiously interfered with her employment. Smith based these claims on the same facts she had presented to the NLRB. After CIGNA answered and denied the allegations, it moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 1, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 2. CIGNA contended that the Act preempted Smith's state claims and that the NLRB's decision barred her claims under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Smith responded that her state complaint w
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