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Armstrong v. County of Sherburne12/12/2000
Appellant Elizabeth Armstrong challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment to respondent Sherburne County. Because we conclude that Sherburne County is entitled to vicarious official immunity, we affirm summary judgment for the county.
FACTS
Appellant Elizabeth Armstrong was a Girl Scout troop leader whose troop attended a K-9 demonstration presented by the Sherburne County Sheriff's Department. Armstrong volunteered to participate in the demonstration, during which she was asked to run from a police dog as if she were a suspect it was pursuing. Armstrong asked the deputy if there was a chance she would get "hurt" or "knocked down" during this exercise. The deputy explained that the dog does not knock people down but that there was a chance she could slip and fall because she was going "to slow down to some degree when a 100-pound dog grabs your arm, so there's always a chance to slip." Armstrong agreed to participate. When the dog caught her, she fell, injuring her leg and knee. Armstrong claims that because the dog caused her fall and resulting injuries, she is entitled to relief under Minn. Stat. §á347.22 (1998), the "dog-bite" statute, against Sherburne County, the dog's owner.
The district court granted the county's summary-judgment motion on the ground that Armstrong had assumed the risk of her injury but denied the county's claim that it was entitled to vicarious official immunity. Armstrong appealed the court's grant of summary judgment and the county filed a notice of review, arguing that the district court erred in failing to apply governmental immunity.
DECISION
Although the district court granted summary judgment to the county on the ground that Armstrong had assumed the risk of her injuries, we conclude that the county has vicarious official immunity, and summary judgment should have been granted on that basis. We therefore affirm the district court, although on a different ground. See Myers through Myers v. Price, 463 N.W.2d at 773, 775 (Minn. App. 1990) (stating that this court will affirm grant of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any ground), review denied (Minn. Feb. 4, 1991).
Under Minnesota law, municipalities generally are liable for their torts and for those of their employees acting within the scope of their employment. Minn. Stat. §á466.02 (1998). But summary judgment may be granted when a governmental entity establishes that the acts of its employees are immune from liability. In re Alexandria Accident of Feb. 8, 1994, 561 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Minn. App. 1997). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). Whether immunity applies is a legal question, subject to de novo review. Gleason v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations, 582 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Minn. 1998).
Official immunity is a common-law doctrine providing that a public official charged by law with duties that call for the exercise of his or her judgment or discretion is not personally liable for damages unless the official is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong. Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988). Official immunity serves to protect government officials from fear of liability that might "deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties." Id. at 678.
In determining whether an official's acts are immune, courts look to whether the acts at issue are discretionary or ministerial. Kari v. City of
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