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Buck v. Freeman12/12/2000
the district court erred in dismissing his claim against MWCARP. The district court determined that it had no subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim because "compensation insurers would be entitled to immunity [under the WCA] since they are subject to the burdens" of the act. If the WCA provides the employee's exclusive remedy, the district court has no jurisdiction. McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1995). Whether the compensation insurers fall under the exclusive remedy provisions of WCA is a question of statutory interpretation, which is reviewed de novo. Frost-Benco Elec. Ass'n v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984).
This court has never considered whether the immunity provision of the WCA extends to the acts of an insurer. The plain language of the statute does not include insurers as employers. But in Konken v. Oakland Farmers Elevator Co., 425 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. App. 1988), review denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 1988), in considering whether a third party was entitled to the protection of the exclusivity provisions of the WCA, this court noted that
third person, other than the employer's compensation insurer, is subject to no burdens of the act and consequently, under the scheme of reciprocity, is entitled to no benefits of the act. Id. at 305 (quoting Modjeski v. Atwell, Vogel & Sterling, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 119, 121 (D. Minn. 1969) (emphasis added)). Furthermore, in Modjeski, the court noted that
here is within the statute a clear pattern to create an inseparable identity between the employer and his insurer insofar as compensation and medical benefits for the injured party are concerned. Modjeski, 309 F. Supp. at 122.
In coming to its conclusion, the court in Modjeski relied on several provisions of the WCA in which insurers and employers are treated similarly. Id. at 121-22. Like the courts in Modjeski and Konken, we conclude that a reasonable reading of the statute results in compensation insurers being protected by the exclusive remedy provisions of the WCA. See Heaslip v. Freeman, 511 N.W.2d 21, 22 (Minn. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Feb. 24, 1994) (in statutory interpretation, a reviewing court must "look first to the specific statutory language and be guided by its natural and most obvious meaning").
Because insurers are subject to the burdens of the WCA, they are also entitled to the benefits of the exclusive remedy provisions of the WCA. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Buck's action against the insurers for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. Private Cause of Action under Minn. Stat. § 79.253, subd. 2 (1998)
Buck contends, in the alternative, that the district court erred in dismissing the action against the MWCARP because Minn. Stat. § 79.253, subd. 2, establishes a duty of inspection and creates a private cause of action not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the WCA. As a result, Buck argues, the failure to inspect Freeman's premises gives rise to a negligence claim.
Statutes do not give rise to a civil cause of action unless the liability is explicit or clearly implicated. Semard v. Edina Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Minn. 1992). The plain language of Minn. Stat. § 79.253, subd. 2, does not explicitly create a cause of action and, therefore, we must decide if one is clearly implied.
There is generally a reluctance on the part of the courts to imply a private right of action. Hoppe by Dykema v. Kandiyohi County, 543 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Minn. 1996); Haage v. Steies, 555 N.W.2d 7, 8 (Minn. App. 1996) ("Principles of judicial restraint weigh against recognizing statutory rights of
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