Schwabe v. Custer's Inn Associates12/12/2000
state with any prior notice or opportunity to fully present its position regarding what issues of material fact regarding causation remained in dispute. The Estate claims, therefore, that this "sua sponte revisiting of summary judgment issues previously decided, at the time set for final pretrial conference, is tantamount to a judicial 'ambush'." The Estate argues that the court's order granting summary judgment should therefore be vacated because the court violated the Estate's right to due process. We disagree.
51 We review discretionary trial court rulings for an abuse of discretion. See Konitz v. Claver, 1998 MT 27, 32, 287 Mont. 301, 32, 954 P.2d 1138, 32 (citations omitted).
Discretionary trial court rulings include such things as trial administration issues, scope of cross-examination, post-trial motions, and similar rulings. See Konitz, 32.
We concluded in Konitz that a district court's decision whether to allow a party to testify at the summary judgment hearing was a discretionary ruling and was therefore subject to review for an abuse of discretion. See Konitz, 32.
We apply the same standard of review in this instance as well.
52 Here, both parties moved for summary judgment in July of 1998, and fully briefed their respective motions. Following an August 18, 1998 hearing, the District Court denied both motions on December 7, 1998. Four months later, at the April 6, 1999 pretrial conference, the court observed that new evidence or new materials had arisen since its ruling on the original motions for summary judgment. Namely, after questioning counsel, the court realized that, contrary to prior indications made to the court, the Estate would in fact be unable to produce expert testimony that would place the element of causation in dispute.
53 Consequently, the court informed both parties that it would therefore revisit its earlier summary judgment decision, and enter judgment in favor of the Defendants. The court provided both parties with a detailed oral pronouncement of its reasons. Then, six weeks later, on May 18, 1999, the court entered its written order granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
54 As a general rule, an order denying summary judgment is interlocutory in character and not res judicata and is therefore subject to later review by the trial court, if circumstances warrant. See generally State ex rel. Davis v. District Court (1977), 172 Mont. 139, 140, 561 P.2d 912, 913; State ex rel. Kosena v. District Court (1977), 172 Mont. 21, 22, 560 P.2d 522, 523. Thus, because the court here denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, we conclude that both parties were effectively on notice, as of December 7, 1998, that the motions may be subject to later review at any time, either upon motion by the parties or at the court's discretion, in the furtherance of "good judicial administration," State ex rel. Kosena, 172 Mont. at 22, 560 P.2d at 523. Under the procedural circumstances here, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by revisiting its earlier order denying summary judgment at the parties' pretrial conference.
55 Far more critical to our analysis, therefore, is the issue of whether the Estate was afforded the opportunity to present further evidence of material facts in dispute related to causation. As a general rule, an oral argument is required for summary judgment unless it is specifically waived by all parties. See Cole v. Flathead County (1989), 236 Mont. 412, 418-19, 771 P.2d 97, 101; Linn v. City County Health Dept., 1999 MT 235, 8, 296 Mont. 145, 8, 988 P.2d 302, 8.
This Court has stated that a district court
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