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Clements v. Alternative Workforce8/14/2002
lf-insured employer under the act, it is necessary to voluntarily assume a recognized status under the workers' compensation laws as an insurer. Iowa Code § 87.4 (1987). Id. See also Boylan, 489 N.W.2d at 743-44 (reading Tallman for the proposition "that the exclusive remedy provision of our workers' compensation act is applicable only to claims against the employer and does not extend to the employer's compensation carrier.").
Alternative reads this language to mean that an employee may not bring any type of common law claim against an uninsured employer, once the employee has elected to seek statutory workers' compensation benefits. Based on our reading of pre-Boylan case law, however, we are not convinced the court's statements in Boylan and Reedy can be read so broadly.
While we agree sections 85.20 and 87.21 limit the liability of employers, those provisions by their terms only limit employer liability for personal injury . Additionally, section 87.21 expressly refers to employee claims involving negligent rather than willful acts of the employer. See Iowa Code § 87.21(1)(a). Given the express language of these code provisions and our highest court's construction of this language in Dugan, Harned and Tallman, we conclude that neither section 85.20 nor section 87.21 precludes this action against an uninsured employer.
We also are not persuaded by Alternative's argument that a remedy already exists under the statute. Although section 86.13 does authorize penalty benefits for the unreasonable delay or withholding of workers' compensation benefits, our highest court has rejected the notion that this provision constitutes the sole remedy for all types of wrongful conduct. See Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 388, 397 (Iowa 2001); Boylan, 489 N.W.2d at 744.
Finally, we reject Alternative's argument that our holding would invade the province of the legislature by creating a remedy not authorized by statute. Our holding is based on a reading of what the legislature said in section 87.21. The legislature said that an employee would have to elect a remedy to obtain compensation for personal injury . It did not state or imply that, by electing the statutory remedy, an employee would relinquish all causes of action against an employer unrelated to that injury.
For these reasons, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Clements' lawsuit and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Zimmer, J., concurs; Sackett, C.J., dissents.
SACKETT, C.J. (dissents)
I would affirm the district court.
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