In re Baker8/20/2002
Suffolk.
April 12, 2002
Limitations, Statute of. Workers' Compensation Act, Injuries to which act applies, Subsequent injury. Statute, Construction.
There is a four-year limitations period under G. L. c. 152, 41, that governs the filing of a workers' compensation claim. There is also a tolling provision in á41, which extends the statute of limitations if the insurer is paying workers' compensation benefits for the injury -- even if no claim has been filed. The question presented is whether the tolling provision of á41 applies exclusively to the claim filing for the particular injury for which the workers' compensation benefits are being paid, or whether that provision may be read to extend the time for filing a claim for a different injury. We hold that the tolling provision of 41 is limited to the injury for which the payments are being made. Accordingly, in this case, the plaintiff's workers' compensation claim for a different injury, filed beyond the four-year limitations period, was correctly dismissed.
1. Procedural and factual background. The claim for workers' compensation benefits that underlies this appeal arose out of a back injury occurring on October 11, 1990. The plaintiff did not file a claim for this injury with Cigna Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (Cigna) until August 10, 1995. Cigna denied the claim for failure to file timely. Both at the time of this October, 1990, injury, and at the time the claim was filed with Cigna in August, 1995, Baker was receiving workers' compensation benefits from Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (Liberty) for another back injury arising out of a different and earlier incident that occurred on March 3, 1989. The prior Liberty claim, and the workers' compensation payments therefor, bear a short explanation to place in context the plaintiff's reliance on the Liberty payments as a basis for invoking the tolling provision for the Cigna claim, and to relate the time sequence for the compensation benefits paid by Liberty, which payments continued past the date of the second injury.
In connection with the March 3, 1989, back injury, an "employer's first report of injury" was filed with Liberty, then the insurer for Komtek Co. (Komtek), Baker's employer. Over the ensuing approximately nineteen months, Baker was sometimes able to work, but at other times he was out on disability leave. When Baker was out of work at Komtek, Liberty paid temporary total disability benefits under G. L. c. 152, á34. This pattern continued to the fall of 1990. Then, on October 11, 1990, at a time when Baker was back at work, Baker experienced severe back pain while leaning over his machine. He left that day and did not return to work thereafter. On October 23, 1990, an "employer's supplemental report of injury" was filed with Liberty. This report listed a March 3, 1989, date of injury and indicated that Baker was disabled. Consistent with the date of injury cited in the report, Liberty assumed liability on the claim and treated the October 11, 1990, event as a recurrence of the March 3, 1989, back injury. Upon receipt of the report, and as in the past when Baker had been out of work due to this injury, Liberty paid Baker 34 temporary total disability payments commencing on October 12, 1990. The á34 payments by Liberty continued until September 5, 1995, the date of exhaustion for such benefits under G. L. c. 152, 34. In light of that imminent exhaustion, in mid-1995 Baker filed a claim with Liberty for additional benefits under 34A for permanent total disability benefits. However, rather than referencing the prior March 3, 1989, injury, this filing listed the second, October 11, 1990, injury as a predicate. In response, Liberty denied co
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