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In re Baker8/20/2002
verage because it was no longer Komtek's insurer in October, 1990. On August 10, 1995, Baker filed a new claim against Cigna, the successor insurer. As noted, Cigna denied coverage. Following an appeal, the administrative judge dismissed the Cigna claim as beyond the limitations period. This decision was affirmed by the reviewing board of the Department of Industrial Accidents. Baker's appeal from the reviewing board's decision was reported by the single justice to a full panel of this court.
2. Analysis of tolling. That part of the tolling provision of á41 at issue states that " he payment of compensation for any injury pursuant to this chapter . . . shall toll the statute of limitations for any benefits due pursuant to this chapter for such injury." G. L. c. 152, 41. Baker isolates the words "payment of compensation for any injury" and contends that the Liberty payments, although attributable to the first, March 3, 1989, injury, were nonetheless payments for an injury under the workers' compensation chapter and thereby tolled the filing of the second claim against Cigna. Under this proffered construction, the á41 tolling provision would not be limited to a particular injury, but rather would extend so far as to generally toll the filing requirement in any circumstance where a worker receives ongoing workers' compensations payments -- even if for a different injury occurring on a different date. We believe that the definitional phrase "any injury" cannot be so read. That the phrase "any injury" is limited to the injury for which payments are being made, and that tolling applies only to that particular injury, is supported by both the text of á41 and the broader context of the workers' compensation statute, chapter 152.
We turn first to statutory terms in á41. In that section, the phrase "any injury " cannot be isolated from the accompanying context. Rather, the term "any injury" is linked to the ensuing term "such injury," that is, the particular one for which the workers' compensation payments are being made. Even if such a connective link somehow might have been expressed more directly in á41, we are not to lose sight of the statutory purpose underlying á41 in favor of grammatical perfection. "If a liberal, even if not literally exact, interpretation of certain words is necessary to accomplish the purpose indicated by the words as a whole, such interpretation is to be adopted rather than one which will defeat the purpose." North Shore Realty Trust v. Commonwealth, 434 Mass. 109, 112 (2001), quoting from Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 249, 251 (1996).
The terms in the tolling provision of á41 must be viewed within the larger chapter 152 statutory framework. That framework reflects a calibrated balance between the notice and filing requirements that protect an insurer against surprise by the filing of indefensibly old claims, and, on the other side of the calculus, the tolling exceptions that protect an injured worker who may feel no need to pursue claim filing because the worker is receiving payments. Thus, the statute of limitations and the interconnected tolling provision in á41 preserve the humanitarian nature and purpose of the workers' compensation law, see Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349 (1914); CNA Ins. Cos. v. Sliski, 433 Mass. 491, 493 (2001), while setting deadlines on claim filings so that an insurer will not be prejudiced by lack of notice of a claim brought forth beyond four years. " he protection afforded to the insurer by these statutory provisions for prompt notice and filing of claim should not be taken from the insurer lightly . . . ." Clifford's Case, 337 Mass. 129, 131 (1958). For a general discussion of the application of the workers' compensation limitat
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