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In re Baker8/20/2002 ions period, see Green's Case, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 910 (1999).
Given this balancing of interests between worker and insurer, á41 is to be read "in accord with 'the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished.'" Champigny v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. at 251, quoting from Telesetsky v. Wight, 395 Mass. 868, 872-873 (1985). To toll the limitations period in the circumstance of an injury for which an insurer is making ongoing payments is in accord with the balanced statutory purposes in á41. That construction does not erode the protection afforded an insurer because, in making payments, the insurer presumptively has notice of the injury, has had a timely opportunity to investigate, and has elected to assume liability for the claim. The construction also serves the humanitarian purpose of assisting the injured worker: by the ongoing payments, the worker is more quickly compensated for the subject injury and, should the insurer stop making payments, the worker is protected by the tolling provision. Thus, the linkage between tolling and the injury on which the payments are being made respects the dual interests of worker and insurer and is consistent with the balance set by the Legislature in á41. In contrast, a virtually free-floating tolling provision, not tying the injury to the ongoing payments, is inconsistent with the statutory framework and purposes.
In addition, the construction adopted here is consistent with the legislative amendments in 1985 (see St. 1985, c. 572, á50, 53) that extended the limitations period in 41 from one year to four years. Again, those amendments reflected a balancing. In "exchange" for an extension in the limitations term for a worker to file a claim from one year to four years, the Legislature reduced the continuing liability of insurers by repealing the part of G. L. c. 152, 49, that had provided an indefinite limitations extension based upon a demonstration of mistake, reasonable cause, or absence of prejudice to the insurer. The construction the plaintiff proposes for á41 would allow for the migration of time lines that this amendment sought to survey with definite boundaries.
Finally, limiting tolling to payments for the subject injury comports with the interpretation of the statute by the Department of Industrial Accidents and thus "accord deference to administrative interpretation of statute." Mugford's Case, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 928, 930 (1998), quoting from Massachusetts Org. of State Engrs. & Scientists v. Labor Relations Commn., 389 Mass. 920, 924 (1983). See Murphy's Case, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 708, 713 (2002).
Decision of reviewing board affirmed.
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