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Ditto v. Stoneberger8/28/2002
ty who made the motion to exclude evidence must make a contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is introduced at trial. Reed v. State, 353 Md. 628, 637 (1999); N.B.S., Inc. v. Harvey, 121 Md. App. 334, 343 (1998). No contemporaneous objection was made as to evidence concerning dependency.
Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the entire case, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-519(a), appellant did move for judgment on the wrongful death counts on the same grounds as set forth in her three pre-trial motions. Although appellant does not contend in her brief that the denial of that motion was error, we will overlook that technicality and decide the issue raised in the Rule 2-519(a) motion, because the issue was raised and decided below.
Maryland's Wrongful Death Statute reads, in pertinent part:
(b) Secondary beneficiaries. - If there are no persons who qualify under subsection (a), an action shall be for the benefit of any person related to the deceased person by blood or marriage who was substantially dependent upon the deceased. Md. Ann. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. ยง 3-904(b) (2001) (emphasis added).
Prior to a 1997 amendment to the statute, a secondary beneficiary had to be "wholly" dependent on the deceased to recover wrongful death benefits.
Edward Stoneberger left no primary beneficiaries. Mary Stoneberger and Candi Blessing were related to the decedent by blood. Thus, we must decide whether the evidence presented was sufficient to allow a jury to find that either Mary Stoneberger or Candi Blessing (or both) were substantially dependent upon Edward Stoneberger.
There is no case law in Maryland interpreting the term "substantially dependent," as it is used in the wrongful death statute. Workers' compensation cases discuss dependency in terms of whether a relative is "wholly" or "partially" dependent on the earnings of the worker, but the term "substantially dependent" is not used in the workers' compensation statute. Those cases are, nevertheless, somewhat instructive.
The test of dependency in workers' compensation cases is "not whether a claimant was capable of supporting himself [or herself] without the earnings of the workman, but whether he [or she] did in fact rely upon such earnings for his [or her] livelihood, in whole or in part, under circumstances indicating an intent on the part of the workman to furnish such support." Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 403 (1999) (citing Meyler v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 179 Md. 211, 217 (1941)).
The Court of Appeals defines "dependent," within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act, as "one who relies wholly or in part upon a workman for the reasonable necessities of life at the time of his accidental injury ." Martin, 353 Md. at 403 (citing Mario Anello & Sons, Inc. v. Dunn, 217 Md. 177, 180 (1958)). In construing "wholly dependent," the Court of Appeals has adopted the seemingly universal rule that:
"Total dependency exists where the dependent subsists entirely on the earnings of the workman; but in applying this rule courts have not deprived claimants of the rights of total dependents, when otherwise entitled thereto, on account of temporary gratuitous services rendered them by others, or on account of occasional financial assistance received from other sources, or on account of other minor considerations or benefits which do not substantially modify or change the general rule as above stated." (Emphasis added.) Martin, 353 Md. at 404 (citing Larkin v. Smith, 183 Md. 274, 280 (1944)).
The Court of Appeals has found a claimant to be totally dependent on her deceased husband, even though she was
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