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Sington v. Chrysler Corp.7/31/2002
Transport Leasing, Inc. I write separately to point out that the majority's pronouncement on the respect to be accorded the precedent of this Court is at best misleading.
I. The Majority Again Disdains Precedent
Today the majority once again discards a prior decision and replaces it with its preferred interpretation of the law. In announcing its new vision of disability law, it refers to its recent pronouncements about the value of precedent in Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), and Robertson v DaimlerChrysler, 465 Mich 732; 641 NW2d 567 (2002). However, the sheer volume of this majority's decisions overturning precedent in the past four years raises serious questions about the degree to which the majority values the principle of stare decisis. Time after time, established law has been discarded on the basis that it was "wrongly decided." It is an amazement to me how frequently the members of this majority have found that esteemed justices who came before them simply misunderstood the law.
In the five-year period from 1993 through 1997, there were approximately twelve cases in which precedent was overturned by this Court. In the five-year period from 1998 through 2002, at least twenty-two cases were overturned.
However, the number of dispositions went down.
The test for overturning precedent articulated in Robinson, and again in Robertson includes two prongs: The first is whether the earlier decision was wrongly decided. The majority has ruled Haske was wrongly decided.
The second Robinson prong is whether overruling the precedent of this Court would work an undue hardship on the basis of reliance interests. In considering that question, the majority labels a worker's reliance on a disability determination under Haske an illegitimate and insignificant expectation. Slip op at 23. It has apparently decided that the Haske decision strayed so far into error that no one should ever have relied on it. It seems to assume that even those having no legal education can and do distinguish between which court precedent should be followed and which should not.
Contrary to the majority's assertions, I do not consider stare decisis a conclusive barrier to change. The majority's effort challenging me to explain some disagreement with Robinson would be better spent explaining the facility with which it excuses itself from exercising the judicial restraint Robinson embraces.
Stare decisis has long been venerated in the law and with good reason. Adherence to this doctrine promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles and contributes to the integrity of the judicial process, both actual and perceived. Robinson, supra at 463, n 21, citing Hohn v United States, 524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998). It is a bedrock principle. When a Court pays no more than lip service to it, the basic integrity of the legal system itself is shaken.
II. Haske was not wrongly decided.
Haske was correctly decided. The definition of disability that it adopted is supported by the fact that the statute treats "disability" and "wage loss" as separate concepts. Examining the language of MCL 418.301(4), one finds that the first sentence defines disability. The second makes clear that it cannot be presumed that one has suffered a wage loss merely because one has become disabled. Of course, that is because one may be disabled but not suffer a wage loss, hence, not be qualified for benefits.
The majority's new definition of disability is: an incapacity after work-related injury or illness to earn maximum wages in work for which the claimant is
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