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Sington v. Chrysler Corp.7/31/2002
s are considered disabled under § 301(4). It is this condition precedent to "reasonable employment"--disability--that is the central issue in this case.
B
Plaintiff, Charles Sington, was employed by defendant, Chrysler Corporation, from July 1971 until March 1997. During his last fifteen years, he performed various production-related jobs as a "floater." Until he was injured, plaintiff's physical activities in the course of his employment included reaching and stretching out above head level, and bending and picking up parts weighing up to thirty pounds.
In June 1994, plaintiff slipped and fell at work, injuring his left shoulder. It is undisputed that the 1994 injury arose in the course of his employment and that defendant voluntarily paid wage loss benefits following that injury. Plaintiff underwent surgery on his left shoulder. Upon returning to work in January 1995, he was restricted from performing work requiring him to reach above the left shoulder. He continued working as a floater with this work restriction until his right shoulder was injured outside his employment. Plaintiff underwent surgery on his right shoulder in August 1996 for a non-work-related injury and was off work until November 1996 when he returned to work as a floater.
Defendant then honored plaintiff's expanded work restrictions that precluded him from lifting, pushing, or pulling over twenty pounds. It is uncontested that plaintiff's average weekly wage was the same before and after both the shoulder injuries.
Plaintiff continued as a floater until March 1997 when he suffered a non-work-related stroke. After the stroke, plaintiff received sickness and accident benefits and was then granted a permanent and total disability pension by defendant.
Thereafter, plaintiff sought worker's compensation benefits related to his inability to work. Plaintiff asserted that he was working in "reasonable employment" under the WDCA when he performed his job with a work restriction after the left shoulder injury , and that he became entitled to worker's compensation benefits when he lost this reasonable employment because of the stroke. This claim is grounded in the interaction between § 301(4) and § 301(5). As mentioned earlier, note 5, if an employee is disabled under § 301(4) and then is afforded reasonable employment under § 301(5), should that employment be terminated before one hundred weeks pass, the employee receives worker's compensation benefits on the basis of the wage at the date of injury under § 301(5)(e). If, on the other hand, one hundred or more weeks have passed and the worker loses the employment through no fault of his own, eligibility for benefits is determined under § 301(5)(d).
While, in this case, no one disagrees with the rules of reasonable employment, there is dispute over whether plaintiff was "disabled" under § 301(4). Plaintiff asserts he was disabled because his left shoulder injury precluded him from performing all the tasks he performed as a "floater" before that injury. Defendant's position is that, before the stroke, plaintiff was not disabled because the left shoulder injury had not reduced his "wage earning capacity" as that is understood in § 301(4), and, thus, once returned to work, plaintiff was not engaged in reasonable employment, with all its attendant benefits, at the time of the stroke. Accordingly, defendant asserts that, as with any other employee who became unable to work because of a non-job-related injury, plaintiff has no remedy in the worker's compensation system.
Faced with the question whether plaintiff was disabled under § 301(4), the worker's compensation magistrate ruled that plaintiff was not engage
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