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Sington v. Chrysler Corp.7/31/2002
y placed substantial reliance on the second sentence of § 301(4), which states that " he establishment of disability does not create a presumption of wage loss." The Haske majority stated that this sentence "eliminates the possibility that disability and wage loss are defined the same way . . . ." Haske, supra at 654-655. Apparently, the concern of the Haske majority was that there would be no distinction between "wage loss" and "disability" if a showing of disability required an overall limitation in "wage earning capacity" in all work suitable to an employee's qualifications and training. That is, the Haske majority was concerned that reading the first sentence in accordance with its plain meaning would render the second sentence nugatory.
However, we do not believe that this concern was justified. As an initial matter, the focus of the inquiry is not on every single job suitable to an employee's qualifications and training--only those that produce the maximum income. Further, the second sentence reflects an understanding that there may be circumstances in which an employee, despite suffering a work-related injury that reduces wage earning capacity, does not suffer wage loss. For example, an employee might suffer a serious work-related injury on the last day before the employee was scheduled to retire with a firm intention to never work again. In such a circumstance, the employee would have suffered a disability, i.e., a reduction in wage earning capacity, but no wage loss because, even if the injury had not occurred, the employee would not have earned any further wages.
In light of the inconsistency of Haske with the plain language of § 301(4), we overrule it and return to the rule established in Rea, which was harmonious with the language of the statute.
C.
In overruling the Haske interpretation of disability, we return to the proper understanding of disability in case law that preceded Haske and that, in our judgment, was more faithful to the WDCA's statutory language.
We recognize that following prior decisions of this Court under the doctrine of stare decisis is generally the preferred course of action "'because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.'" Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 463; 613 NW2d 307 (2000), quoting Hohn v United States, 524 US 236, 251; 118 S Ct 1969; 141 L Ed 2d 242 (1998). Nevertheless, stare decisis is "not to be applied mechanically to forever prevent the Court from overruling earlier erroneous decisions determining the meaning of statutes." Robinson, supra at 463. Rather, it is "'our duty to re-examine a precedent where its reasoning . . . is fairly called into question.'" Id. at 464, quoting Mitchell v W T Grant Co, 416 US 600, 627-628; 94 S Ct 1895; 40 L Ed 2d 406 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). In the present case, the treatment of the term "disability" as used in § 301(4) of the WDCA has been fairly called into question.
In considering whether to overrule a prior decision of this Court, the first inquiry, of course, is whether that prior decision was wrongly decided. Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 757; 641 NW2d 567 (2002); Robinson, supra at 464. For the reasons we have previously discussed, Haske was wrongly decided because it is clearly inconsistent with the plain language of the definition of "disability" in § 301(4).
Nevertheless, as we recognized in Robinson, that a prior case was wrongly decided "does not mean overruling it is invariably appropriate." Robinson, supra at 465. We must consider whether ov
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