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Sington v. Chrysler Corp.7/31/2002
erruling a prior erroneous decision would work an undue hardship because of reliance interests or expectations and, conversely, whether the prior decision defies "practical workability." Robertson, supra at 757; Robinson, supra at 466. In particular, the Court must ask whether the previous decision has become so embedded, so accepted, so fundamental, to everyone's expectations that to change it would produce not just readjustments, but practical real-world dislocations. It is in practice a prudential judgment for a court. [Id.]
In the present case, we see no significant reliance interest or expectation that will be disrupted by overruling Haske. Obviously, a work-related injury potentially compensable under the worker's compensation system is an unexpected event, so it is difficult to imagine actions that an employee would take in reliance on Haske. Moreover, it is doubtful that there could be a legitimate expectation interest in receiving worker's compensation wage loss benefits on the basis of an earlier work-related injury that did not, in fact, result in any overall reduction in wage earning capacity in work suitable to one's qualifications and training. Also, while a less significant factor, we see reason for concern about the "practical workability" of Haske, particularly in terms of deciding what constitutes a single job for the purpose of applying that decision.
Further, it is particularly appropriate to overrule a prior erroneous decision of this Court that has failed to apply the plain language of a statute. As we observed in Robinson, supra at 467, "it is to the words of the statute itself that a citizen first looks for guidance in directing his actions." Indeed, when a court confounds the legitimate expectations of a citizen by misreading a statute, "it is that court itself that has disrupted the reliance interest." Id.
As we observed in Robertson, supra at 756, the values underlying general respect for stare decisis are also enhanced "by a legal regime in which the public may read the plain words of its law and have confidence that such words mean what they say and are not the exclusive province of lawyers." Because Haske failed to apply the plain language of the definition of "disability" in ยง 301(4), and in light of the lack of a significant reliance interest in the Haske decision, we are impelled to overrule it.
IV.
In our order granting leave to appeal in this case, we further directed the parties to address "whether Haske . . . and Powell v Casco Nelmor Corp, 406 Mich 332[; 279 NW2d 769] (1979), are reconcilable." 465 Mich 940 (2002). However, in light of our determination that the Haske definition of disability is erroneous and should be overruled, it is no longer necessary to consider whether Haske and Powell may be reconciled.
Moreover, Powell was decided under the old common-law "favored work" doctrine, before that doctrine was effectively codified by the Legislature in the WDCA in its "reasonable employment" provisions. Codification of common-law rules makes those rules of no consequence if they are inconsistent with the codification. In Perez v Keeler Brass Co, 461 Mich 602, 606; 608 NW2d 45 (2000), we discussed the effect of codification on common-law rules regarding favored work:
Subsection (5) [of the WDCA, related to reasonable employment] was added to the statute in 1982. Before that time, the statute did not address "reasonable employment," and this issue was governed by an area of the common law known as the "favored-work doctrine." Now, however, the quoted statutory provisions establish the law in this area. The Legislature chose the words of the statute, and we are bound by them. Any cases decid
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