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Sington v. Chrysler Corp.7/31/2002
ed under the common law before subsection (5) was enacted are essentially irrelevant; to the extent that the common-law favored work doctrine is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, the Legislature has changed the common law. [Citations omitted.]
Accordingly, in considering whether a person who has ceased working in a "reasonable employment" position is entitled to worker's compensation wage loss benefits, worker's compensation magistrates and the WCAC should examine the provisions of MCL 418.301(5)(d) and (e), rather than decisions under the old common-law favored work doctrine such as Powell. In short, as Perez indicates, Powell is now "essentially irrelevant."
V.
We now turn to the circumstances of this case. Plaintiff was qualified and trained as a "floater," although there is no indication in the record regarding whether plaintiff was qualified and trained in any other jobs. To illustrate the application of our analysis, we will assume for the moment that plaintiff's job as a floater produced the maximum wages in work suitable to plaintiff's qualifications and training, although the WCAC on remand may find otherwise. Plaintiff was evidently able to perform a variety of production-related tasks as a "floater." His physical restriction after his left shoulder injury that precluded him from lifting above shoulder level is the only relevant restriction because the right shoulder injury was not work-related. In order to establish that he had a "disability" because of the left shoulder injury, plaintiff had to show that that injury resulted in a limitation in his wage earning capacity in work suitable to his qualifications and training.
The magistrate and WCAC did not apply this test. Rather, they focused, pursuant to Haske, on the fact that plaintiff was working in a "regular job " after his left shoulder injury . While that may be a strong indication that the left shoulder injury did not amount to a disability, it is not, standing alone, dispositive. An inquiry must be made regarding whether the "regular job " was suitable to plaintiff's qualifications and training at the time of the injury. Also, if plaintiff's injuries only enabled him to perform that "regular job" because of accommodations provided by defendant, his wage earning capacity might be less than his actual wages.
Accordingly, we conclude that this case should be remanded to the WCAC for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.
VI.
Justice Kelly's dissent merits a response. As Justice Kelly has pointed out, in the last three and a half years, there have been cases reversing past precedent of this Court.
She cites sixteen. These should be seen in the context of the overall number of dispositions by this Court during the same period. From January 1, 1999 to June 30, 2002, there were 8,198 dispositions by this Court. Thus, it is rare (in fact, a frequency of under one-fifth of one percent) when precedent is overturned, but it does sometimes happen. During this period, the issue of treatment of precedent has arisen primarily in review of earlier Supreme Court cases interpreting statutes. In fact, of the cases that Justice Kelly has cited where precedent has been overruled, eleven are within this category. As the dissents to these actions have been forceful, so as to inform as to the doctrine of stare decisis and its limits, this Court in Robinson chose to discuss the doctrine in depth as well as its proper application.
Repeatedly, since Robinson was decided, the rules established in that case, which it should be noted are themselves entitled to respect as precedents of this Court, have been disregarded in dissents aut
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