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Roberts v. Mecosta County General Hospital8/27/2002
FOR PUBLICATION
ON REMAND
In the original opinion, this Court held that defendants had waived their challenge to the adequacy of plaintiff's notice of intent in this medical malpractice case by waiting until after the complaint was filed. Roberts v Mecosta Co General Hosp, 240 Mich App 175, 185-186; 610 NW2d 285 (2000). Thereafter, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute imposes no obligation on defendants to object to the notice of intent before the complaint is filed. Roberts v Mecosta Co General Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 66; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). The matter is now on remand to this Court for consideration of issues not decided in the original appeal.
Plaintiff argues that the notices of intent filed in this case were, in fact, adequate and, in the alternative, even if they did not strictly comply with the statute, the notices substantially complied with the statute and substantial compliance is sufficient. We need not address the substantial compliance argument because we are persuaded that the notices did, in fact, strictly comply with the statute.
As the Supreme Court reminded us in this case, if statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we are to enforce the statute as written not read additional requirements into the statute:
An anchoring rule of jurisprudence, and the foremost rule of statutory construction, is that courts are to effect the intent of the Legislature. People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, 123, n 7; 594 NW2d 487 (1999). To do so, we begin with an examination of the language of the statute. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, then we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and the statute is enforced as written. People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001). A necessary corollary of these principles is that a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not derived from the words of the statute itself. Omne Financial, Inc v Shacks, Inc, 460 Mich 305, 311; 596 NW2d 591 (1999). [Roberts, supra at 63.]
Thus, our consideration of the question whether plaintiff's notice of intent was adequate must begin with the language of the statute and the requirements it creates. The statute at issue here, MCL 600.2912b(4), provides as follows:
The notice given to a health professional or health facility under this section shall contain a statement of at least all of the following:
(a) The factual basis for the claim.
(b) The applicable standard of practice or care alleged by the claimant.
(c) The manner in which it is claimed that the applicable standard of practice or care was breached by the health professional or health facility.
(d) The alleged action that should have been taken to achieve compliance with the alleged standard of practice or care.
(e) The manner in which it is alleged the breach of the standard of practice or care was the proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice.
(f) The names of all health professionals and health facilities the claimant is notifying under this section in relation to the claim.
We find the statute to be clear and unambiguous, requiring that the notice of intent must, at a minimum, "contain a statement" of the six enumerated items. See Roberts, supra at 65-66.
In the case at bar, plaintiff sent two notices of intent, one on September 19, 1996, to defendant hospital, and one on September 23, 1996, to the remaining defendants. We will look at each statutory item and compare it to the notices to determine if the notices were adeq
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