 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Stewart v. State12/20/2000
m suit except as it consents to be sued." Brewington v. Brewington, 215 Tenn. 475, 480, 387 S.W.2d 777, 779 (1965). This doctrine of sovereign immunity "has been a part of the common law of Tennessee for more than a century and provides that suit may not be brought against a governmental entity unless that governmental entity has consented to be sued." Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1997). Despite this general grant of immunity, however, the courts of this state have frequently recognized that the Tennessee Constitution has modified this rule of absolute sovereign immunity by providing that " uits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct." Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17; see also Kirby v. Macon County, 892 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tenn. 1995).
Pursuant to its constitutional power to provide for suits against the state, the legislature created the Tennessee Claims Commission in 1984 to hear and adjudicate certain monetary claims against the State of Tennessee. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 9-8-301 to -307 (1999). While the Claims Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims arising against the state, cf. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a) (1994), this jurisdiction is limited only to those claims specified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a). If a claim falls outside of the categories specified in section 9-8-307(a), then the state retains its immunity from suit, and a claimant may not seek relief from the state. Cf. Hill v. Beeler, 199 Tenn. 325, 329, 286 S.W.2d 868, 869 (1956) (stating that "except as the Legislature of the State consents there is no jurisdiction in this Board of Claims to entertain suits against the State").
The courts of this state have traditionally held that any statute granting jurisdiction to hear a claim against the state must be strictly construed, as any such statute is in derogation of the common law rule of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Norman v. Tennessee State Bd. of Claims, 533 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tenn. 1975) ("We further recognize that the statutory provisions governing the Board of Claims have been strictly construed, in view of the fact that they do represent an encroachment upon the sovereign immunity and upon the assets of the State."); State ex rel. Allen v. Cook, 171 Tenn. 605, 609, 106 S.W.2d 858, 860 (1937) ("Statutes passed by the Legislature, under the authority of article 1, section 17, of the Constitution, permitting suits against the state, being in derogation of the sovereign's exemption from suits, must be strictly construed."). Nevertheless, in 1985, the General Assembly amended section 9-8-307(a) to express its intention as to the jurisdictional reach of the Claims Commission: "It is the intent of the general assembly that the jurisdiction of the claims commission be liberally construed to implement the remedial purposes of this legislation." Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(3).
Hence, although we have traditionally given a strict construction to the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction, we also recognize that our primary goal in interpreting statutes is "to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature." Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn.1993)). If the legislature intends that its statutes waiving sovereign immunity are to "be liberally construed," then the courts should generally defer to this expressed intention in cases where the statutory language legitimately admits of various interpretations. A policy of liberal construction of statutes, however, only requires this Court to give "the most fa
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|