 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Stewart v. State12/20/2000
Commission possessed jurisdiction under section 9- 8-307(a)(1)(F), which authorizes claims against the state for the " egligent care, custody or control of personal property." Although its decision is unclear on this point, the intermediate court seems to have found that Trooper Ray was negligent in failing to call a tow truck to remove the 1974 Nova and in allowing the disabled car to be moved to the other side of the road by the county deputies. Based on our review of the cases interpreting section -307(a)(1)(F), we observe that no court in Tennessee has held that this section permits a claim for personal injury caused by the negligent care, custody, or control of personal property. Rather, virtually every case that has interpreted section -307(a)(1)(F) has construed that statute to permit claims against the state only when the negligence of a state employee in the care, custody, or control of personal property has resulted in the damage or loss of that particular item of personal property itself. This having been said, however, the precise issue of whether section - 307(a)(1)(F) permits claims for damage to persons caused by the negligent care, custody, or control of personal property was not addressed by any of these opinions, and it remains an issue of first impression in this state.
The plaintiff urges this Court to apply a liberal construction to this subsection and allow claims of personal injury resulting from the negligent care, custody, or control of personal property. Because the language of section 9-8-307(a)(1)(F) is subject to various interpretations, and because the plaintiff's interpretation is not clearly contrary to the language of the statute, a liberal construction of this statute counsels against construing it strictly to apply only to claims for damage to the property itself. Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiff that section 9-8-307(a)(1)(F) does permit claims against the state for damages caused by the negligent care, custody or control of personal property by state employees.
In response, the State argues that such a construction would render inoperative two other specific grants of jurisdiction: section - 307(a)(1)(A), which permits claims arising from the "negligent operation or maintenance of any motor vehicle," and section -307(a)(1)(M), which permits claims arising from the " egligent operation of machinery or equipment." We disagree. In the typical case, the proof needed to satisfy the element of negligent maintenance or operation of automobiles or machinery is much different than the proof needed to establish care, custody, or control of those same items of personal property. Indeed, as can be seen in this case, the element of control simply does not equate to that of operation or maintenance, because while Trooper Ray had control of the Nova prior to his release of the car, he was not involved in its maintenance or operation. Because section -307(a)(1)(F) contemplates a different type of liability than either section - 307(a)(1)(A) or section -307(a)(1)(M), we conclude that a liberal construction of section 9-8-307(a)(1)(F) will not render any other provision of the act unnecessary or mere surplusage. As such, this Court may liberally construe the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission under this provision and still give effect to the remaining grants of jurisdiction in section 9-8-307(a).
Nevertheless, even applying a liberal construction to section - 307(a)(1)(F) to permit claims arising from the negligent control of personal property, we find that jurisdiction is still not present under this provision in this case. As soon as Trooper Ray properly released the vehicle, which was in operating condition at the time of the release, his legal duty as
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|