 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group12/21/2000
its disposition of class actions. Nevertheless, Tennessee "simply has no interest, except perhaps out of comity, in furthering the efficiency and economy of the class action procedures of another jurisdiction, whether those of the federal courts or those of another state." Wade, 182 F.3d at 287.
Adoption of the doctrine would run the risk that Tennessee courts would become a clearinghouse for cases that are barred in the jurisdictions in which they otherwise would have been brought. Litigants who ordinarily would have filed in other states' courts would file in Tennessee solely because our cross-jurisdictional tolling doctrine would have effectively created an overly generous statute of limitations. See Wade, 182 F.3d at 287; Portwood, 701 N.E.2d at 1004. We cannot sanction such forum shopping.
We understand that our ruling may promote "protective" filings by plaintiffs who wish to preserve their right to file suit in Tennessee while they seek class certification elsewhere. Any administrative burdens Tennessee courts will suffer from those protective filings are greatly outweighed by the burdens presented by the mass exodus of rejected putative class members from federal court to Tennessee. Any risk of duplicative litigation resulting from the protective filings may be avoided by grant of a stay by the state court until the federal ruling on class certification is made. See Wade, 182 F.3d at 287 n.8.
Finally, the practical effect of our adoption of cross- jurisdictional tolling would be to make the commencement of the Tennessee statute of limitations contingent on the outcome of class certification as to any litigant who is part of a putative class action filed in any federal court in the United States. Cf. Wade, 182 F.3d at 288. It would essentially grant to federal courts the power to decide when Tennessee's statute of limitations begins to run. Such an outcome is contrary to our legislature's power to adopt statutes of limitations and the exceptions to those statutes, see, e.g., Phillips v. Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co., 79 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Tenn. 1935); Doe v. Coffee County Bd. of Educ., 852 S.W.2d 899, 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); L.H. Poppenheimer v. Bluff City Motor Homes, 658 S.W.2d 106, 111-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983), and would arguably offend the doctrines of federalism and dual sovereignty. If the sovereign state of Tennessee is to cede such power to the federal courts, we shall leave it to the legislature to do so.
CONCLUSION
We decline to adopt the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional tolling in Tennessee. As the plaintiffs claim a "universal date of discovery" that is outside the statute of limitations, our rejection of cross- jurisdictional tolling renders plaintiffs' claims time-barred. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment is hereby affirmed.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to plaintiffs, Anthony Maestas, Eugenio Camara, Paul Hill, and William Shook, for which execution may issue if necessary.
Page 1 2 3 Tennessee Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|