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Gorostieta v. Parkinson12/15/2000
28. Parkinson counters that the jury instructions given by the court covered all aspects of the applicable law in this case and there was no prejudicial error in removing the sentence complained of.
A. Error as to Jury Instructions Given
We will first dispose of the Gorostietas' argument regarding jury instructions 16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 28. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 11, 974 P.2d 269; Walker v. U.S. Gen., Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996). Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the " rief of the appellant shall contain . . . argument [that] shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added). An appellate court "`is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" Thomas, 1999 UT 2 at 11 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)).
The Gorostietas complain of jury instructions 16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, and 28 in their statement of the issues but then completely fail to support this claim anywhere in their argument or their reply brief. We therefore do not address it.
B. Excluding Statutory Language from Jury Instruction
The Gorostietas requested that section 41-6-80 of the Utah Code be used verbatim as a jury instruction. This statute in its entirety reads:
The operator of a vehicle shall exercise care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian and shall give an audible signal when necessary and exercise appropriate precaution upon observing any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated, or intoxicated person. This section supersedes any conflicting provision of this chapter or of a local ordinance. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-80 (1998).
The court delivered this statute as a jury instruction, omitting the last sentence, "This section supersedes any conflicting provision of this chapter or of a local ordinance." The Gorostietas argue that by omitting the last sentence, the court misled the jury as to the legal duties of Parkinson and Dalinda Gorostieta.
When reviewing jury instructions, we must consider the challenged instruction in context. See Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, 37, 993 P.2d 191; Jensen v. Intermountain Power Agency, 1999 UT 10, 16, 977 P.2d 474. Generally, the rewording of a statute as a jury instruction is not error as long as it does not change the essential meaning of the statute. See 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1132, at 648; accord Holmes v. Heidebrecht, 10 Utah 2d 74, 75-76, 348 P.2d 565, 566 (1960). Therefore, we must determine the meaning of the omitted sentence to ascertain whether its omission from the jury instruction changed the meaning from that of the statute.
When interpreting a statute, we must first look to the statute's plain language for the legislative intent. See Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, 9, 4 P.3d 783. We look no further if the plain language of the statute is unambiguous on its face. See id.
Section 41-6-80 explains the duty a vehicle operator has with respect to pedestrians and in particular pedestrians who fall into the category of "any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated, or intoxicated person." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-80. The last sentence states, "This section supersedes any conflicting provision of this chapter or of a local ordinance." Id. The Gorostietas argue that this last sentence
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