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State v. Bottrell12/15/2000
flashbacks impaired her ability to act with intent:
A: {The flashbacks} are, of course, by definition quite emotionally laden events, and they would directly affect her ability to both perceive what was going on about her accurately and to form specific intents.
Q: Do you have an opinion as to what triggered the inability to form the specific intent?
A: Well, she was clearly in a position where she perceived herself again in an abusive position where her life was being threatened. Again, to what degree that is from a reasonable perspective and what degree that is influenced by her hypervigilance and her PTSD, which would tend to see things as sometimes more dangerous than they are, I think both are arguably present.
Certainly when you start to be flooded with memories of abusive events, emotional, that's a very strong emotional content. This is an individual who has lived many years of her life as a substance abuser to avoid those feelings. So it's hard to imagine that when those feelings and those memories are flooding her that she would be able to form the specific intent and be responding only to that which is in front of her. Report of Proceedings at 92- 93.
Under ER 702, Dr. Stanulis's testimony would assist the jury in determining if Bottrell had the requisite specific intent to murder Hall. '{M}ental disorders are beyond the ordinary understanding of lay persons.' Ellis, 136 Wn.2d at 517. Such evidence is relevant, under ER 401 and ER 402, to determine whether Bottrell's mental capacity was diminished. Further, Dr. Stanulis's testimony was admissible because he based it upon a 'medical certainty' that the malady, PTSD, affected Bottrell. This standard is consistent with established case law. See Edmon, 28 Wn. App. at 102 (expert must examine and diagnose defendant personally and testify 'to an opinion with reasonable medical certainty'); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975) (expert proposing to testify that criminal defendant could not form specific intent must base testimony on a 'reasonable medical certainty'); State v. Fullen, 7 Wn. App. 369, 383, 499 P.2d 893 ('{i}f the candid medical expert cannot state an opinion with reasonable medical certainty because the symptoms before him are insufficient to support an expert opinion, then he may not speculate'), review denied, 81 Wn.2d 1006 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 985 (1973); State v. Moore, 7 Wn. App. 1, 499 P.2d 16, review denied, 81 Wn.2d 1004 (1972) (holding the same). In the offer of proof Dr. Stanulis was asked the specific question of 'Do you have an opinion as to whether she was able to form the specific intent to commit premeditated first degree murder in this case.' Report of Proceedings at 92. Although, in Stanulis's opinion, Bottrell was not able to form specific intent to commit first degree premeditated murder, he offered no opinion about her ability to form an intent to steal from Hall, dead or alive. Rather, he focused solely on Bottrell's state of mind at the time of the killing, when she was reexperiencing via flashbacks past abusive episodes in her life.
Here, if Bottrell suffered from PTSD at the time of Hall's murder, the disorder may have negated the intent necessary for the crime charged, first degree premeditated murder, and for its lesser included offense of second degree murder. Because Dr. Stanulis testified that Bottrell suffered from PTSD, that the PTSD caused flashbacks, and that the flashbacks impaired Bottrell's ability to act with intent, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Stanulis's testimony at trial. See Ellis, 136 Wn.2d at 523. We reverse this conviction and remand for a
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