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Pfaff v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company12/21/2000
rates why CR 60 requires a movant to demonstrate 'facts constituting a defense to the action,' or, to use White's terms, 'substantial evidence . . . support{ing}, at least prima facie, a defense to the claim asserted by the opposing party{.}' After a party obtains a judgment, it is presumed that he or she has substantial evidence to support his or her claim. If a CR 60 movant cannot produce substantial evidence with which to oppose the claim, there is no point to setting aside the judgment and conducting further proceedings. But if the CR 60 movant can produce substantial evidence, each party should be permitted (assuming White's other factors are met) to present his or her case to a trier of fact at a properly convened trial.
White's first factor is the one primarily in dispute on this appeal. Pfaff takes the position that the trial court erred by not finding that her facts and inferences were stronger than State Farm's, and by not concluding from such a finding that State Farm did not have a 'defense' within the meaning of CR 60(e)(1). She explained her position during the following colloquy at oral argument:
COURT: Are {the facts that you are presently reciting} the facts most favorable to State Farm?
COUNSEL FOR PFAFF: No, these are the facts most favorable to us.
COURT: Could I ask why those are material?
COUNSEL: Those are material because we believe that the trial court didn't consider those issues{.}
COURT: So the {trial} court sort of becomes the trier of fact?
COUNSEL: Yes.
COURT: The trial court weighs and balances and decides whether it believes State Farm?
COUNSEL: Exactly. Exactly.{}
We reject this view of the trial court's function on a CR 60 motion. We hold instead that when a trial court is considering whether a CR 60 movant has presented 'facts constituting a defense' within the meaning of CR 60(e)(1), the trial court must take the evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the movant. The movant in this case was State Farm, and it presented evidence which, if later believed by a trier of fact, would be a defense to Pfaff's claims. Accordingly, the trial court was both permitted and required to rule that State Farm had come forward with 'facts constituting a defense' or, in White's terms, 'substantial evidence' of a 'prima facie' defense.
White's second and third factors are not seriously in dispute. It is apparent that State Farm's failure to answer resulted from a mistake, and that State Farm acted with due diligence when it discovered the mistake.
White's fourth factor is in dispute, but only because Pfaff claims that setting aside the judgment will force her to go to trial. In our view, however, the prospect of trial cannot constitute, without more, 'substantial hardship' within the meaning of White's fourth factor. If the law were otherwise, a judgment would never be set aside, for that always generates the prospect of trial. Because this record shows no hardship other than the prospect of trial, it also shows 'lack of substantial hardship' within the meaning of White's fourth factor.
The trial court did not err by setting aside the judgment, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Morgan, J.
We concur:
Bridgewater, J.
Hunt, A.C.J.
Page 1 2 3 Washington Personal Injury Attorneys
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