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Davis v. Tremaine12/11/2000
Boyd was not in title. If this malpractice claim of Dr. Davis accrued in June 1993, then the September 1997 commencement of this lawsuit was untimely, even considering the tolling agreement. To support its contention that Dr. Davis knew by June 1993 that Dr. Boyd did not have title in May 1992, DWT points to the June 1993 communications between Dr. Davis' then counsel, Bogle & Gates, and Dr. Boyd's then counsel, Perkins Coie. The communications show that Dr. Davis knew, as of June 1993, that Dr. Boyd did not have title to the building as a result of a recent title search. According to DWT, Dr. Davis' knowledge of the state of title in June 1993, together with his knowledge of other adverse information about Dr. Boyd, caused the three-year statute to accrue in June 1993.
What Dr. Davis knew and when he knew it are material questions on which reasonable minds could differ. Thus, summary judgment on those questions was improper.
The primary question is whether Dr. Boyd had title at closing in May 1992 when he gave Dr. Davis the option to purchase and Dr. Davis incurred the obligation to pay rent to Dr. Boyd. A related question is whether Dr. Boyd's June 1993 representations, through his then lawyers, were matters on which Dr. Davis was reasonably entitled to rely so as to stop further inquiry. Neither of these questions can properly be answered on the basis of the record before us.
It does not necessarily follow that because title to the building was not vested in Dr. Boyd in June 1993 that it was not vested in him in May 1992. The crucial question is whether Dr. Boyd was vested with title at the time he gave the option in 1992, not the status of title over a year later. That is a material factual question central in determining when Dr. Davis knew of all elements of his claim. Moreover, whether the June 1993 explanation that Dr. Boyd's then attorneys provided to Dr. Davis was plausible in light of all the information he then had at his disposal is likewise an issue on which the finder of fact must make a determination. This record is simply insufficient to support the conclusion that Dr. Davis knew or should have known by June 1993 the factual basis of all elements of his claim concerning the alleged failure of DWT to obtain a title search prior to closing.
Denny's Restaurants, Inc. v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., on which DWT relies, is distinguishable. There, Denny's purchased a restaurant in Mount Vernon and later discovered that its title insurer at closing failed to detect defects in the title. As a result, the restaurant lost 60 feet of parking space. We held that Denny's negligence claim against its title insurer accrued when it discovered the title defects because it then had knowledge of all elements of its cause of action. Specifically, we noted that Denny's by then had knowledge that its injury was proximately caused by the title insurer's failure to discover and disclose the title defects. The injury was purchasing a leasehold estate that was worth less than the consideration paid.
Here, the injury is also the purchase of a leasehold estate that may be worth less than the consideration Dr. Davis paid because of undiscovered title defects at closing. But there are genuine issues of material fact as to when Dr. Davis knew or should have known of his claimed injury. Whether it was in June 1993 or in the fall of 1995 are factual determinations to be made at trial. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's summary dismissal of Dr. Davis' negligence claim on failure to discover the state of title at the time of closing.
We affirm the order of summary judgment to the extent that it bars the claims under the six-year statute and the
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