 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Columbia Health Care11/29/2000
isagree with appellant's argument on this issue, also. The only medical opinion addressing the "major cause" requirement was Dr. Hilborn's assertion that Ms. Anderson's degenerative spinal changes "were probably fifty percent or more responsible for her symptomatology and need for treatment." The Commission stated in its supplemental opinion that it did not interpret this statement to necessarily mean that the degeneration was the major cause, or more than fifty percent, of her wage-loss disability. We think reasonable minds could come to this conclusion.
According to a report by Dr. Holladay, Ms. Anderson had been reporting back pain for several months prior to her compensable injury . Thus, symptoms had surfaced before that time, which presumably related to her degenerative back condition. However, Ms. Anderson was able to work full-time at her regular job before the work-related incident, but has not returned to work since. So, even though Dr. Hilborn opined that Ms. Anderson's pre-existing condition was the major cause of her "symtomatology and need for treatment," there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that the compensable injury, and not the pre-existing condition, was the major cause of her permanent disability, in that disability refers to a claimant's diminished ability to earn wages. See Ark. Code Ann. ยง 11-9-102(8) (Supp. 1999). This is so because section 11-9-102(5)(F)(ii)(b) quoted above speaks of "major cause" in the disjunctive, i.e., "if the compensable injury is the major cause of the permanent disability or need for treatment." [Emphasis added.] While the injury may not have been the major cause of her need for treatment, the Commission could properly find that the injury was the major cause of her disability.
We now turn to Ms. Anderson's argument, on cross-appeal, that she should have been awarded permanent and total disability due to her advanced age, lack of education, and extremely limited job prospects. Although there was evidence that Ms. Anderson suffered permanent wage-loss disability as a result of her compensable injury , there was also evidence that her injury did not render her permanently and totally disabled. There were medical opinions in the record stating that, while Ms. Anderson's injury prevented her from returning to her previous job duties, she might be able to perform sedentary work or other employment within her limitations. Two sedentary jobs were identified by the vocational counselor, but Ms. Anderson failed to pursue these potential opportunities. Moreover, there was evidence that her current disability relates in part to health problems unrelated to the compensable injury. Based on the evidence presented, we affirm the Commission's finding that Ms. Anderson suffered 50% wage-loss disability as a result of her compensable injury.
Ms. Anderson's remaining issue on cross-appeal is that the Commission erred in failing to award benefits based on the eight percent permanent partial anatomical rating initially assigned by Dr. Hilborn. We disagree. Even though Dr. Hilborn initially assigned an eight percent rating, he later changed his opinion by stating that Ms. Anderson's pre-existing degenerative changes could be deducted, thereby reducing her compensable impairment rating to six percent. We conclude that there was substantial evidence to support the permanent impairment rating awarded by the Commission.
Affirmed.
Hart and Neal, JJ., agree.
|