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POTTER v. STATE11/9/2000
The fundamental issue in this case is whether Officer Charles Edward Motsinger had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to conduct an investigative stop and frisk consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and also consistent with the provisions of applicable Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. The stop and frisk of Michael Ray Potter produced a plastic bag containing marijuana and methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Potter entered a conditional plea of guilt after the trial court declined Potter's motion to suppress the evidence. Potter then appealed the conviction and sentence based upon his conditional plea of guilty, contending that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support an investigative stop and frisk. In a 4-2 decision, the court of appeals reversed the findings of the trial court and ordered the evidence suppressed. See Potter v. State, 70 Ark. App. 495, 20 S.W.3d 454 (2000). Because the Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are not identical to the protections against unreasonable searches and seizures expressed in Arkansas's statutes and Rules of Criminal Procedures, and because the interpretation of our rules should be clarified, we granted the petition for review as requested by the State.
In his argument to the court of appeals, appellant argued that harassment was the only crime for which there was reasonable suspicion and that harassment without the threat of physical harm does not meet the criteria of Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 and 3.4. In response, the State asked that the trial court's order be affirmed. In specific response to appellant's argument, the State contended that our Rules 3.1 and 3.4 should be interpreted to be identical to the criteria established by Terry, supra with respect to unreasonable searches and seizures. The court of appeals limited its decision to the question whether reasonable suspicion of a nonviolent misdemeanor would justify a stop and frisk under our Rule 3.1. While we do not review the court of appeal's decision, we note that the court of appeals ruled in favor of appellant without a careful analysis and review of the trial court's findings that there existed a reasonable
suspicion of both the felony offense of stalking and the misdemeanor offense of harassment.
[1, 2] On a petition for review, we review the case as if the appeal had been originally filed in this court. State v. Brunson, 327 Ark. 567, 940 S.W.2d 440 (1997). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we make an independent examination based on the totality of the circumstances and reverse only if the trial court's ruling was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Muhammad v. State, 337 Ark. 291, 988 S.W.2d 17 (1999). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. Based upon our review of the totality of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court's denial of Potter's motion to suppress should be affirmed.
Potter claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the stop was not authorized by Rule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and because the frisk was not authorized by Rule 3.4 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. We first address the question whether Officer Motsinger had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment guarantees that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. 4. This is a fundamental right th
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