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Williams v. Lakeview Co.11/9/2000
ction. Id. at 415-16, 104 S.Ct. at 1872-73. Nevertheless, other courts have recognized the difference. See, e.g., Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1994) ("For our part, we think it significant that the constitutional catchphrase is disjunctive in nature . . . ."); Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Group Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that specific jurisdiction "does not require that the cause of action formally 'arise from' defendant's contacts with the forum; rather, this criterion requires only 'that the cause of action, of whatever type, have a substantial connection with the defendant's in-state activities.'"); Thomason v. Chemical Bank, 661 A.2d 595, 600 n.4 (Conn. 1995) (opining that the "arising out of" language refers to a causal relationship, whereas "relates to" does not).
In Lawson v. Darrington, 416 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), the court held that specific jurisdiction could be exercised over an Iowa liquor vendor despite the fact that the defendant's Minnesota advertisements did not cause the plaintiffs to visit its bar. The facts are strikingly similar to those here. Darrington drove himself and Lawson from their home in Minnesota to a bar in Iowa, twelve miles south of the state line. While there, the bar served drinks to Darrington, who was a minor at the time. After the men crossed the border on their way home, the car crashed and both of them were injured. Lawson sued the bar in a Minnesota state court.
The defendant argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction without a judicial finding that its advertising activities in Minnesota "directly caused" Lawson and Darrington to travel to Iowa. Id. at 844. The court responded:
We disagree with this narrow interpretation. Due process is satisfied by a showing that the Minnesota activities of the nonresident liquor vendor relate to the operation of the bar and solicitation of Minnesota residents. . . .
. . . [The bar] actively solicited customers in Minnesota to come to Iowa to drink . . . . [The bar] could reasonably anticipate being hailed into Minnesota courts for injuries incurred by Minnesota residents on a return trip from Iowa establishment. Id. at 844-45.
In Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 2000)(en banc), a Maryland-based grocery chain regularly advertised in District of Columbia newspapers. Ms. Moreno was a D.C. resident who visited one of Shoppers' stores and was injured. She had never seen any of the ads. Nevertheless, the court held that District of Columbia courts could exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant because the plaintiff's claim was related to the company's activities in the District. Because Shoppers regularly solicited D.C. residents, the court concluded that it "could be sued in the District on a claim similar to that filed by Ms. Moreno." Id. at 336. The plaintiff was among a class of persons targeted by the ads--i.e., District of Columbia customers. Thus, the defendant could reasonably expect to be haled into court in that jurisdiction.
Today's majority fears that allowing an Arizona action "in the absence of any nexus" will obliterate the difference between general and specific jurisdiction. Supra at 13. But that implies the existence of two completely separate and distinct, isolated and dissimilar, classes of jurisdiction, a concept with which I respectfully disagree. In my view, we should analyze the present issue as one involving varying degrees of relationship. General and specific jurisdiction lie on the same broad spectrum, ranging from specific contacts which directly cause a claim, to general, systematic, and continuous contacts
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