 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Andrews v. Samaritan Health System12/11/2001
atute, which states, " n order to perfect a lien granted by A.R.S. § 33-931 . . . ." This holding is in accord with those in other jurisdictions with medical lien statutes similar to Arizona's. See Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 793 F. Supp. 321, 323 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (the lien exists automatically after treatment); Guin v. Carraway Methodist Med. Ctr., 583 So. 2d 1317, 1319 (Ala. 1991); see also Pub. Health Trust of Dade County v. Carroll, 509 So. 2d 1232, 1234 (App. Fl. 1987) ("lien attaches at the moment an injured person is admitted").
We hold that a medical lien is automatically granted by A.R.S. § 33-931 upon the care and treatment of a person injured by the negligence of a third party. Of course, this is non-recourse debt, rather than personal debt. A hospital may enforce statutory liens even where there is no personal recourse available directly against a patient. LaBombard v. Samaritan Health Sys., 195 Ariz. 543, 991 P.2d 246 (App. 1998) (liens against tort recovery of AHCCCS members enforceable even when there is "no right to recover directly" from patient). The fact that the hospitals have no personal recourse against plaintiffs, by virtue of their insurance coverage, does not alter the fact that a debt remains between the hospitals' customary charges and the amounts paid by plaintiffs' insurers. See Provident Nat'l Assurance Co. v. Sbrocca, 180 Ariz. 464, 467, 885 P.2d 152, 155 (App. 1994).
We find that not only do all but one of the provider contracts create an obligation for payment of the customary charges, but that our legislature has provided the hospitals with a means to secure that obligation through an automatic lien. See A.R.S. § 33-931. Providers may collect this "debt" pursuant to the medical lien statute. Id. This is true even though the hospitals here were compensated according to the bargained-for terms in the provider contracts. Thus, the hospitals may assert liens against all plaintiffs' tort recoveries including Markland's.
This result is supported by the cases that involve coordination of benefits. For example, in Nahom v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 180 Ariz. 548, 554-55, 885 P.2d 1113, 1119-1120 (App. 1994), this court held that when a patient had two insurance policies and the first had an unconditional "payment in full" clause, the hospital was still entitled to collect from the second policy under the coordination of benefits language. There, like here, a "payment in full" clause did not totally extinguish the debt. See id.
This result is also in alignment with the statutes applicable to Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS) and Medicare patients. Under Arizona law, hospitals may not impose personal liability on AHCCCS patients; however, hospitals may assert medical liens against tort proceeds for the balance of the charges not paid by AHCCCS. See A.R.S. §§ 36-2903.01(J)(4), 36-2903.01(N)(Supp. 2000); A.R.S. § 11-291(F) (allowing county providers to recover from indigent tort recoveries); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-22(a)(4), 1395mm(e)(4)(Supp. 2000) (hospitals treating Medicare patients may enforce liens as provided under their contracts); 42 C.F.R. §§ 417.528(b); 422.108(d)(2000) (Medicare HMOs and Medicare +Choice organizations may charge or authorize a provider to charge any other applicable insurance, including liability insurance, for services or charge the enrollee to the extent he or she was paid for covered medical expenses). Although these statutes preclude a hospital from attempting to collect directly from an AHCCCS member or eligible person, see A.R.S. § 36-2903.01(N), the Arizona legislature authorized providers to "collect any unpaid portion of its bill from other third p
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Arizona Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|