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Andrews v. Samaritan Health System12/11/2001
financial burden on providers and to encourage hospitals to render emergency care to patients without regard to ability to pay. See LaBombard, 195 Ariz. at 548, 18, 991 P.2d at 251; Gartin v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 156 Ariz. 32, 35, 749 P.2d 941, 944 (App. 1998). Here, the plaintiffs' insurers did not assign any rights to the hospitals. Rather, the right to the medical liens springs from A.R.S. § 33-931. We see no reason to invalidate the medical lien statute as written by the legislature given its obvious value and purpose.
Accordingly, we hold that the contracts setting forth the providers' right to assert a statutory medical lien are not an illegal assignment of plaintiffs' personal injury claims.
IV. MEDICAL LIENS UNDER $250
Plaintiffs claim that, under A.R.S. § 33-931(C), the hospitals may not assert their liens for less than $250 against Park and Weirick. Section 33-931(C) provides, in part, that medical liens
are applicable to all customary charges by hospitals or ambulances of political subdivisions but are restricted to customary charges in excess of [$250] by all other providers and privately owned ambulance companies . . . .
The hospitals argue that the statute entitles hospitals to liens for all customary charges, but limits other providers and privately owned ambulance companies to liens in excess of $250. We agree.
In LaBombard, this court stated that "the phrase 'all customary charges,' in subsection (B) indicates that even non-public hospitals are entitled to assert a lien for 'all customary charges . . . in excess of [$250].'" 195 Ariz. at 548, 19, 991 P.2d at 251. However, in LaBombard the amount of the medical lien was not at issue and it was well in excess of $250. See id. We are not obligated to follow dicta and, thus, proceed to an analysis of whether liens can be asserted by privately owned hospitals for amounts under $250. See Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Superior Court, 181 Ariz. 469, 472, 891 P.2d 936, 939 (App. 1994).
We find that the meaning of A.R.S. § 33-931(C) is not readily clear. When statutory language is subject to different interpretations, we will adopt an interpretation "that is most harmonious with statutory scheme and legislative purpose." Saenz v. State Fund Workers' Comp. Ins., 189 Ariz. 471, 474, 943 P.2d 831, 834 (App. 1997) (citation omitted). We consider "the statute's context; its language, subject matter and historical background, its effects and consequences; and its spirit and purpose." City of Tucson v. Pima County, 190 Ariz. 385, 386, 949 P.2d 38, 39 (App. 1997) (citation omitted). The purpose of the medical lien statute is to "lessen the burden on hospitals and other medical providers imposed by non-paying accident cases." LaBombard, 195 Ariz. at 548, 18, 991 P.2d at 251 (quoting In re Guardianship of Bloomquist, 523 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Neb. 1994)). Providing hospitals a means of recovery induces hospitals to render emergency care to patients without regard to ability to pay. See Gartin, 156 Ariz. at 35, 749 P.2d at 944 (citation omitted).
The statutory language grants liens to "hospitals or ambulances of political subdivisions" without regard to amount. A.R.S. § 33-931(C). Plaintiffs contend that the phrase "of political subdivisions" modifies both hospitals and ambulances. However, the legislature's subsequent use of the term "privately owned ambulance companies" indicates an intent to distinguish only the types of ambulance companies. This is supported by the "last antecedent rule" as applied in Arizona; where there is a qualifying phrase we will apply the phrase only "to the word or phrase immediately preceding as long as there i
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