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Fisher v. Government Employees Insurance Co.11/16/2000
lvania law. The court agreed and excluded the evidence, holding that the Pennsylvania statute prohibiting double recovery was not pre-empted by ERISA because its application "would not result in interference with the [ERISA plan] . . . would merely prevent collection of a windfall by Austin." Id. at 278. The court ruled that the state statute would be pre-empted "only when application of the prohibition against double recovery the effect of regulating, and interfering with, claims by or against an employee benefits plan operating under ERISA." Id. (emphasis in original). It saw "no reason why Pennsylvania's policy of prohibiting double recovery should not be given full effect, so long as doing so does not shift liability to the [ERISA plan]." Id. (footnote omitted).
In this case, the trial court correctly held that application of D.C. Code § 35-2106 (g) did not regulate, or interefere with, Ms. Fisher's ERISA Plan. The court noted that section 35-2106 (g)
does not mandate that an ERISA plan provide coverage where coverage from other sources is not provided. The statute only says that PIP coverage will fill in those areas where the ERISA plan does not provide coverage. If the ERISA plan provided no coverage, consistent with § 2106 (g), the PIP coverage would pay the entire amount claimed.
Because the statute does not "shift[ ] ultimate liability for medical and health care benefits to the ERISA [Plan]," Travitz, 13 F.3d at 710, it does not regulate or restrict the Plan in any way. Section 35-2106 (g) is a law of "general application [which] does not affect the structure, the administration, or the type of benefits provided by an ERISA plan, the mere fact that the statute [might have] some economic impact on the plan does not require that the statute be invalidated." Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985). Therefore, we conclude, the effect of section 35-2106 (g) on the ERISA plan is "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral . . . to warrant a finding that the law `relates to' the plan." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21.
The numerous cases on which Ms. Fisher relies are all distinguishable because, in each of them, the statute in question conflicted with a provision or right of the ERISA plan, thereby shifting the burden of payment onto the ERISA plan in circumstances in which it would not otherwise have borne that burden. See, e.g., FMC Corp., supra note 10 (state law precluding subrogation from tort recovery contradicted ERISA plan's right to subrogation); Travitz, supra note 8 (state law precluding subrogation from tort recovery conflicted with ERISA plan provision that members could not receive benefits if they were recoverable through legal action or settlement); Lincoln Mutual Casualty Co. v. Lectron Products, Inc., Employee Health Benefit Plan, 970 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1992) (statutorily required coordination of benefits clause in no-fault insurance policy conflicted with provision in ERISA plan holding no-fault insurers primarily responsible); Wall, supra note 8 (state law prohibiting subrogation conflicted with ERISA plan provision entitling it to subrogation for any expenses paid under the plan). By contrast, D.C. Code § 35-2106 (g) in no way affects the rights or obligations of the ERISA Plan in this case and does not shift any greater burden onto the Plan than it would otherwise have to bear.
Thus we hold that the trial court properly granted GEICO's motion for summary judgment. That judgment is accordingly
Affirmed.
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