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Dada v. Children's National Medical Center11/2/2000
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (Hon. Ellen Segal Huvelle, Trial Judge)
Argued October 10, 2000
Appellant Bisi Dada, as mother and next friend of Magnus Dada ("Magnus"), a minor, challenges the ruling of the trial court denying appellant's motion to reopen discovery and to reconsider summary judgment. Appellant contends that the court abused its discretion in denying the discovery motion and refusing to permit appellant to amend her Rule 26 (b)(4) statement. Appellant claims that a revised 26 (b)(4) statement would have enabled her to establish a prima facie case of medical negligence and, thus, survive appellee, Children's National Medical Center's ("Children's Hospital's" or "appellee's"), motion for summary judgment. Specifically, appellant argues: (1) that the trial judge erroneously applied the factors set forth by this court in Weiner v. Kneller, 557 A.2d 1306 (D.C. 1989), and (2) that Magnus' minor status was not appropriately considered by the trial court. Under this court's instructions in Dada v. Children's Nat'l Med. Center, 715 A.2d 904 (D.C. 1998) (hereinafter "Dada I"), and the deferential standard of review, the trial court's ruling should not be disturbed. Therefore, we affirm.
In her underlying complaint, appellant alleges that negligent care provided by the staff of Children's Hospital proximately caused injuries to the left arm of her minor daughter Magnus. On July 1, 1996, over a month after the scheduling order deadline and after appellee had filed its own 26 (b)(4) statement, appellant's trial counsel, Ms. Maryrose Ozee Nwadike, filed appellant's 26 (b)(4) statement, identifying Dr. Nixon Asomani, Dr. Cedric Poku-Dankwah, and Dr. Chester Haverback as experts. Appellant's 26 (b)(4) statement, however, set forth nothing regarding the experts' expected causation and/or standard of care testimony.
Pursuant to the scheduling order, discovery closed on August 9, 1996. On August 23, 1996, Children's Hospital moved for summary judgment contending that appellant was incapable of producing the expert testimony necessary to sustain a medical malpractice action. Supporting its motion, Children's Hospital submitted affidavits from Dr. Poku- Dankwah and Dr. Asomani as well as a medical report from Dr. Haverback, revealing that they would not be serving as causation and/or standard of care experts.
On September 4, 1996, appellant's counsel filed an opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment as well as a separate motion for leave to extend discovery. In the discovery motion, Ms. Nwadike expressed surprise at the affidavit testimony of appellant's purported experts. In her opposition to appellee's motion for summary judgment, however, Ms. Nwadike neglected to reference her contemporaneous discovery motion. On September 10, 1996, the trial judge granted appellee's motion for summary judgment.
On September 21, 1996, appellant filed a motion to reconsider. Therein, appellant's counsel maintained that she was shocked by the affidavits of her experts and argued that those affidavits constituted newly discovered facts that warranted vacating the order granting summary judgment. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion to reconsider, but Ms. Nwadike failed to appear. On November 6, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the motion to reconsider.
On August 13, 1998, this court vacated the order denying the motion to reconsider, and remanded for consideration and disposition of the motion to reopen discovery. See Dada I, supra, 715 A.2d at 911. After a briefing period, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on February 11, 1999, pursuant to this court's decision in Da
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