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Brucha v. Cruise America12/6/2001
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Ney and Taubman, JJ., concur
Plaintiff, Peter Brucha, appeals the judgment that held he was not entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits under his motor vehicle insurance and rental contract with defendant, Cruise America, Inc. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Defendant is a self-insured corporation in the business of renting vehicles. On September 25, 1995, plaintiff rented a motor home and four motorcycles from defendant in Las Vegas, Nevada, and was listed as an "authorized driver" in the contract. Not having other insurance, he arranged for insurance coverage with defendant. A week later, on October 2, 1995, while riding one of the rented motorcycles in Durango, plaintiff was injured in an automobile-motorcycle accident. Plaintiff made a claim for PIP benefits under his insurance and rental contract with defendant, but defendant denied liability.
Plaintiff then sued defendant for breach of contract and bad faith breach of contract, and also asserted claims under the Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, § 10-4-701, et seq., C.R.S. 2001 (the No-Fault Act). Later, the trial court entered summary judgment in his favor on the issue of coverage. On defendant's motion for reconsideration, another judge concluded that, because plaintiff was not the "named insured" under the insurance and rental contract, he was not entitled to PIP coverage; therefore, it entered summary judgment in defendant's favor. The parties then stipulated to entry of final judgment and the trial court so ordered.
Plaintiff contends the entry of summary judgment for defendant on the coverage issue was error. He argues that he was the named insured on the insurance and rental contract with defendant covering the rented motor home and, therefore, was entitled to PIP coverage for his motorcycle accident. We agree.
An insurance policy is a contract, and its interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Stein, 940 P.2d 384 (Colo. 1997).
One of the purposes of Colorado's No-Fault Act is "to avoid inadequate compensation to victims of automobile accidents." Section 10-4-702, C.R.S. 2001. See also Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hertz Corp., 981 P.2d 1091 (Colo. 1999); Thompson v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 940 P.2d 987 (Colo. App. 1996). The No-Fault Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial and beneficent purposes. See Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hertz Corp., supra.
Every insurance policy covering use of a motor vehicle in Colorado, even if it is issued in another state, must provide coverage at least as extensive as the minimum coverage required by §§ 10-4-706 and 10-4-707, C.R.S. 2001. Section 10-4-711(4), C.R.S. 2001; see also Ranger v. Fortune Insurance Co., 881 P.2d 394 (Colo. App. 1994). Defendant's insurance and rental contract complied with those requirements.
Under § 10-4-705(3), C.R.S. 2001, the minimum coverage for motorcycles does not include PIP coverage as set out in § 10-4-706. Therefore, unless a motorcycle owner specifically purchases PIP coverage, he or she cannot recover PIP benefits for an injury incurred while operating his or her own motorcycle. Thompson v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 618 P.2d 736 (Colo. App. 1980); see also Martinez v. Allstate Insurance Co., 961 P.2d 531 (Colo. App. 1997).
However, § 10-4-707(1)(a), C.R.S. 2001, mandates PIP coverage for a named insured who is injured while operating a vehicle that does not belong to him or her. See also Brennan v. Farmers Alliance M
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