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Sprague v. California Pacific Bankers & Insurance Ltd.12/27/2001
good faith settlement of the underlying claim.
The stipulated judgment may be considered as evidence of the Millards' damages if it resulted from a good faith settlement and the settlement was reasonable based on all of the circumstances. You are instructed that although the stipulated judgment is a final judgment entered against the Millards, the Court's approval of the stipulated judgment is not binding in determining whether the stipulated judgment is reasonable. The reasonableness of the stipulated judgment is for you, and only you, the jury, to decide.
We conclude that the trial court's instruction is wrong to the extent that it fails to instruct the jury that if and when the jury decided that the stipulated judgment resulted from a good faith settlement and the settlement was reasonably based on all of the circumstances, the stipulated judgment was then presumptive evidence of the breaching insurer's liability. In this case, however, we conclude as a matter of law that the amount of the settlement was not reasonably based on all of the circumstances and, therefore, the amount of the settlement was not presumptive evidence of the amount of the damages.
D.
Plaintiffs contend that the directed verdict in favor of Tokunaga in Phase One of the trial was reversible error. Plaintiffs cite the following evidence in support of their position that a directed verdict should not have been granted in Tokunaga's favor.
(1) [Insurance Resources] delivered by mail the aviation liability policy to the Millards on July 9, 1993, some eight months after the disappeared of the Grumman aircraft and Mr. and Mrs. Adams; Delivery of the policy was prohibited by H.R.S. Section 431:8-202.
(2) At the time [Insurance Resources] delivered the insurance policy issued by the unauthorized carrier, [Tokunaga] was corporate vice-president, director, and office and business manager[.]
(3) [Tokunaga] was aware of the legal requirement to perform due diligence to determine the financial condition and integrity of out of state unauthorized carriers before placement of insurance, pursuant to H.R.S. Section 431:8-302[.]
(4) [Tokunaga], as a licenced insurance agent, corporate officer of [Insurance Resources] and as officer and business manager of the company, knew that it did not maintain any files with regard to the insurance transaction involving the Millards, in violation of H.R.S. Section 431:9-229 . . . .
(5) [Tokunaga] knew that [Insurance Resources] from its incorporation, had not held annual meetings, or maintained any corporate records or files.
(Record citations omitted.)
Considering that William and Grace disappeared on November 5, 1992, we agree with the trial court that Tokunaga's involvement commencing July 9, 1993, is insufficient as a matter of law to subject him to liability in this case.
E.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court reversibly erred when it denied Plaintiffs' motion to amend judgment, filed July 29, 1999, whereby Plaintiffs requested that the court amend the July 12, 1999 judgment by imposing liability upon James Nottage and Nottage Insurance for all negligence, bad faith, and punitive damages awarded against California Pacific. Plaintiffs assert that such a result is required by HRS ยง 431:8-204. We disagree for the reasons stated in section III.A above.
F.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court reversibly erred when it entered its August 17, 1999 Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs to Defendant Tokunaga, and Costs to Sally Jo Nottage and Insurance Resources, Inc. and James T. Nottage and Jim Nottage Insura
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