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Buford v. Cardinal Services12/12/2001
ring in time associated with the L/B J.A. Holleman when Mr. Buford was injured. " eaman-status is determined by the employee's entire employment-related connection to a vessel, [or fleet of vessels] and not by the immediate circumstances or location of the plaintiff's injury." Hufnagel, 182 F.3d at 346. See also Chandris, 515 U.S. at 363, 115 S.Ct. at 2187. Based on the totality of the circumstances of Mr. Buford's employment, we do not find this to be a case where "undisputed facts reveal that a maritime worker has a clearly inadequate temporal connection to vessels in navigation, [where] the court may take the question from the jury by granting summary judgment or a directed verdict." Id., 515 U.S. at 371, 115 S.Ct. at 2191.
When the facts are analyzed against the backdrop of the jurisprudence, we believe that a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Buford spent more than 30 percent of his employment time aboard Cardinal-owned and controlled vessels. However, we note here that even if Mr. Buford did not attain the 30 percent requirement, we have doubt as to whether that would necessarily defeat his claim.
A jurisprudential exception to the 30 percent cutoff has developed. Even when the vessels in question are not under the defendant's common ownership or control, a maritime worker may still fall within coverage of the Jones Act if he is "continuously subjected to the perils of the sea and engaged in classical seaman's work." Roberts, 266 F.3d at 378 (quoting Little, 734 So.2d at 938).
Nothing in the record suggests that Cardinal did not own and control the five vessels at issue in this case, and we do not find the common ownership and control of the vessels to be a central issue here. The facts of this case, therefore, do not squarely fit within this particular exception. However, we call attention and make reference to it simply to underscore what the United States Supreme Court originally said in Chandris, that " worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. This figure of course serves as no more than a guideline. . . ." Chandris, 515 U.S. at 371, 115 S.Ct. at 2191(emphasis added). See also Roberts, 266 F.3d 375; Little, 734 So.2d at 936-937 ("It is important to keep this `thirty percent guide' in proper context. We note that this guideline does not create a bright- line rule."); Richard, ___ So.2d at ___ ("Thirty percent is not a magic number automatically rendering an individual's connection with a vessel substantial in duration and nature. Thirty percent is simply a guideline, a minimum below which an individual generally does not qualify as a seaman").
Classification of a maritime worker as a seaman is to be determined in consideration of this directive: "the Jones Act remedy is reserved for sea-based maritime employees whose work exposes them to `the special hazards and disadvantages to which they who go to sea in ships are subjected.'" Wisner, 731 So.2d at 205 (quoting Chandris, 515 U.S. at 370, 115 S.Ct. at 2190). If this is true, then coupled first with the fact that the 30 percent requirement was meant only as a general directive and second, that an exception has been carved out, we believe that a lesser than 30 percentage will not necessarily defeat a finding of seaman status if the work aboard the vessels exposes the seaman to maritime hazards.
Given the facts of this case, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find such hazardous exposure if it first found that Mr. Buford fell short of the 30 percent duration requirement of the second prong. Again, we make this point only as an aside, and reiterate again that we believe that a reaso
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