 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Darbonne v. Wal-Mart Stores11/2/2000
iding over one hundred miles from the place of trial; or (c) in another state without provocation by the party offering the deposition. La.Code Civ.P. art. 1450(3)(a), (b), and (c). Mr. Nelson resides in Illinois and therefore is at great distance from a court in Louisiana. It was thus within the court's discretion to accept the deposition rather than insist that Mr. Nelson travel to Louisiana to testify in court.
The Court's Failure to Formally Qualify Plaintiff's Expert Witness
Johnson Controls and its insurer also argue that the trial court erred when it implicitly accepted the deposition testimony of plaintiffs' witness, Mr. Nelson, as an expert in the field of batteries and explosives without formally declaring him to be an expert in these fields. Although they cite no legal authority for their proposition, the defendants state in their brief that it was incumbent upon the court to make a formal ruling on the record that Mr. Nelson either was or was not qualified to testify as an expert in the area of automotive battery explosions.
There is no requirement that a party formally tender an expert witness or that a court formally declare that a witness is accepted as an expert. For example, in a criminal case we held that there was no error in permitting a detective to testify as an expert, even though court did not formally accept the detective as an expert, where the expert possessed sufficient practical experience as an expert in the packaging and distribution of marijuana to testify on that matter. State v. Martin, 543 So.2d 1020 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989). Here, Mr. Nelson's curriculum vitae listing his educational background and work experience was attached to the deposition. Mr. and Mrs. Darbonne's attorney offered the deposition and attachment into evidence. During the deposition, defendants' counsel questioned Mr. Nelson regarding his qualifications. The court heard the objections of the defense and then stated that these objections would be noted for the record. Thus, the court impliedly accepted the deposition testimony on Mr. Nelson's qualifications. The fact that the trial court accepted the testimony of Mr. Nelson as an expert without expressly so stating did not constitute error.
The Burden of Proof
Finally, Johnson Controls and its insurer argue that Mr. and Mrs. Darbonne did not establish their case by a preponderance of the evidence. They claim that the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) which would allow plaintiffs to recover damages for a defective product. Whether or not the battery manufactured by the defendants exploded and injured the plaintiff was not at issue in this case. Rather, the issue concerned the cause of the explosion of the battery. The LPLA establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products in La.R.S. 9:2800.54, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
A. The manufacturer of a product shall be liable to a claimant for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or another person or entity.
B. A product is unreasonably dangerous if and only if:
(1) The product is unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition as provided in La.R.S. 9:2800.55 . . . .
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.55 states:
A product is unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control, the product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's specific
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Louisiana Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|