 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Wasson12/4/2001
Appellant challenges his sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (1996), arguing that the sentencing court's triple upward departure relied on factors that were already part of the elements of the offense and thus could not be utilized as bases for a departure. We affirm as modified.
FACTS
Appellant William Wasson was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (1996), based on acts committed against his stepdaughter. Appellant was sentenced to 30 years in prison as a patterned sex offender under Minn. Stat. §á609.1352 (1996). Appellant challenged his sentence, and this court reversed appellant's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing so that the sentencing court could determine, after the parties presented additional evidence in the form of expert assessments, whether appellant met the statutory definition of a patterned sex offender. State v. Wasson, C4-00-443 (Minn. App. Oct. 31, 2000). Upon remand, instead, the sentencing court found that severe aggravating circumstances existed and sentenced appellant to 258 months, which is a triple upward durational departure from the presumptive sentence. Appellant now challenges this sentence.
DECISION
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by upwardly departing from the presumptive sentence, claiming that the aggravating factors identified by the state and the sentencing court are part of the elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (1996).
First, a sentencing court "has broad discretion to depart only if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present." State v. Best, 449 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Minn. 1989). In other words, the sentencing court "shall use the presumptive sentence unless the individual case involves substantial and compelling circumstances." State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1981) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Givens, 544 N.W.2d 774, 777 n.4 (Minn. 1996). When determining whether to depart, the sentencing court should focus on "whether the defendant's conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question." State v. Cermak, 344 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Minn. 1984).
Generally, when an upward durational sentencing departure is warranted, the limit is double the presumptive sentence length. State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. 1981). There are rare cases, however, where severe aggravating circumstances exist, which would justify a greater-than-double departure up to the statutory maximum of the offense for which a defendant was convicted. State v. Williams, 608 N.W.2d 837, 840 (Minn. 2000). Review of such a decision must be based on appellate court's "collective, collegial experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts." State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142, 146-47 (Minn. 1982).
Appellant was convicted of and sentenced for engaging in sexual penetration of his stepdaughter, with whom appellant had a significant relationship and who was under 16 years of age at the time of the incident, which included multiple acts that occurred over an extended period of time. These acts were all elements of the crime. See Minn. Stat. §á609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii) (stating elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct of which appellant was convicted). Appellant began abusing his stepdaughter when she was approximately 11 years old and it continued until she was approximately 15. The abuse occurred in the home and in appellant'
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 Minnesota Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|