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Richardson v. McGriff11/15/2000
or attempted crime.
(b) Defense by employer. - A law enforcement officer sued for acting under subsection (a) of this section shall be defended in any civil action by the law enforcement officer's employer as if the incident had occurred in the officer's jurisdiction.
(c) Benefits. - A law enforcement officer who is injured in taking action under subsection (a) of this section is entitled to workers' compensation, disability, death benefits, life insurance and all other benefits to the same extent as if the injury had been sustained in the officer's jurisdiction.[ ]
Another example of a similar legislative intent is found within the scheme of the Maryland Tort Claims Act. See Md. Code (1999 Repl. Vol.), State Government Article, §§ 12-101, et seq. The immunity from tort liability of one who qualifies as "State personnel," as defined in the Act, for his or her tortious act or omission is waived when the act or omission is made with malice or gross negligence. Md. Code (1998 Repl. Vol., 199 Supp.), CJP, § 5-522 (b).
That gross negligence has been expressly provided for as a cause of action for civil liability against certain public officials under certain provisions, and not under others, comports with our recognition in Shoemaker that "the Legislature conceived of malice as something beyond the merely reckless or wanton conduct that would be embodied within gross negligence." 353 Md. at 164, 725 A.2d at 560. I conclude, therefore, that based on traditional common law requirements of actual malice, that the implied malice derived from gross negligence in tort law does not satisfy the malice requirement necessary to pierce public official immunity under the common law.
Petitioner argues that admission of the police guidelines aids in proving that Respondent acted in a grossly negligent manner. Petitioner mounts no argument that the guidelines would be probative of actual malice. I would hold, therefore, that even if the Circuit Court erred in not admitting the guidelines, such error did not prejudice Petitioner with regard to the gross negligence count.
Although I have no quarrel with the majority's reasoning and disposition of Petitioner's Batson issue (Maj. op. at 32-35), I would not reach or decide it under my view of the other issues explained supra.
Judge Eldridge has authorized me to indicate that he agrees entirely with this dissenting in part, concurring in part opinion. Chief Judge Bell also agrees with this opinion, save Part III, D (Gross Negligence) and the reference to the majority's resolution of the Batson issue, upon which he writes separately.
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