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Trujillo v. Northern Rio Arriba Electric Cooperative12/6/2001 and outrageous and thus did not satisfy the threshold requirement for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The claim must also fail because there was insufficient evidence to support the view that the emotional distress experienced by Mr. Trujillo was severe. See Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 182, 812 P.2d at 1330 (Opinion of Donnelly, J.); U.S.A. Oil, Inc. v. Smith, 415 So. 2d 1098, 1101 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982) (" n order to prevent the tort of outrage from becoming a panacea for all of life's ills, recovery must be limited to distress that is severe."). "To recover emotional distress damages, those damages must be `severe.'" Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne Mortuary, Inc., 1998-NMSC-004, 20, 124 N.M. 613, 954 P.2d 45 (quoting Flores v. Baca, 117 N.M. 306, 313, 871 P.2d 962, 969 (1994)). Severe emotional distress means that "`a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances.'" Id. (quoting Folz v. State, 110 N.M. 457, 469, 797 P.2d 246, 254 (1990)). In other words, the distress must be "so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j. Mr. Trujillo testified that his initial reaction was to feel offended by being called "Sir" in the termination letter and that he resented being fired after giving NORA so many years. He also testified that he felt "lousy" and depressed and that Prozac was prescribed for him. His wife described him as being depressed and sleeping long hours and as having erratic eating habits during the period after he was fired. Without minimizing Mr. Trujillo's distress, we conclude that this evidence was legally insufficient under New Mexico law. "The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it." Phifer v. Herbert, 115 N.M. 135, 139-40, 848 P.2d 5, 9-10 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j), overruled on other grounds by Spectron Dev. Lab. v. Am. Hollow Boring Co., 1997-NMCA-025, 31-32, 123 N.M. 170, 936 P.2d 852.
E. Loss of Consortium.
Our holding on Mr. Trujillo's claim of wrongful termination also reverses the loss of consortium claim by Mrs. Trujillo which was premised on her husband's termination. See Archer v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 1997-NMSC-003, 11, 122 N.M. 703, 930 P.2d 1155 ("Loss-of-consortium damages are contingent upon the injured person's entitlement to general damages.").
F. Damages.
We offer the following to explain why in this case it was necessary to discuss both retaliatory discharge and breach of implied contract. This Court held in Silva v. Albuquerque Assembly & Distribution Freeport Warehouse Corp, 106 N.M. 19, 21, 738 P.2d 513, 515 (1987) and reaffirmed in Gandy, 117 N.M. at 444-45, 872 P.2d at 862-63, that a plaintiff may not recover twice for the same harm; that is, compensatory damages may not be awarded in an employment case on both a claim of breach of an employment contract and a claim of the tort of retaliatory discharge. As we concluded in Silva, trial courts should instruct the jury that "they could find either a breach of contract or retaliatory discharge, but not both." Silva,106 N.M. at 21, 738 P.2d at 515. This distinction was not made in instructions given in this case. On the special verdict form, the jury was permitted improperly to find for Mr. Trujillo on both the claims of retaliatory discharge and breach of an implied contract. The jury was also not instructed that the Human Rights Act does not permit the award of punitive damages. See Gandy, 117 N.M. at 443, 872 P.2d at 874 ("Punitive damages are sometimes recoverable in tort actio
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