Campbell12/13/2001
re J. P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943). In fact, "' he traditional view is that if a judge can be disqualified for bias following a comment . . . during the court proceedings, there is no limit to disqualification motions and there would be a return to "judge shopping."'" Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 546 (Utah 1988) (quoting L. Abramson, Judicial Disqualification Under Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 23 (1986)). Moreover, for "alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must . . . result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1710 (1966).
pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994).
Mere "expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger," are insufficient to establish the existence of bias or partiality. Id. at 555-56, 114 S. Ct. at 1157.
Finally,
because [a judge's] fact-finding is based on his estimates of the witnesses, of their reliability as reporters of what they saw and heard, it is his duty, while listening to and watching them, to form attitudes towards them. He must do his best to ascertain their motives, their biases, their dominating passions and interests, for only so can he judge of the accuracy of their narrations.
He has an official obligation to become prejudiced in that sense. Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence. If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called trials, he could never render decisions. Linahan, 138 F.2d at 653-54 (footnote omitted).
Here, after examining the record, we conclude that not only did Debry fail to meet the threshold requirement, i.e. submission of an affidavit alleging judicial bias or prejudice to the trial court, see Wade, 869 P.2d at 11 (stating the preservation rule "applies where the bias or prejudice of a trial judge is alleged for the first time on appeal"), but that there is no indication of extra-judicial prejudice in the record. We therefore find no merit in Debry's argument.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying Debry's motion for an extension of time. We also affirm the trial court's decision granting CMS summary judgment, and awarding CMS prejudgment interest.
William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge
James Z. Davis, Judge
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Utah Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|