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Color Country Management v. Labor Commission12/6/2001
its. See id.
The reasoning of the Mathews Court applies equally here. The procedures under UAPA outlined above, the nature of the evidentiary determination to be made, the fact that there were multiple hearings, continuing jurisdiction to cure defects, and the fact that the claimant bears the ultimate burden, all persuade us that the risk of erroneous deprivation under existing procedures is low, and that there is little, if any, probable value in the additional procedures suggested by Color Country.
The final Mathews factor requires an examination of the governmental interest at stake, including the burdens of added procedures. As the Mathews Court noted:
At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of protecting those whom the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available for any particular program of social welfare are not unlimited. Id. at 348, 96 S. Ct. at 909.
The concern with depleting limited social resources to add procedural protections is of particular significance here because one of the primary underlying purposes of the Act is to dispense with expense, delay, and uncertainty of recovery for employees. See Wilstead, 407 P.2d at 693.
Thus, we do not agree with Color Country that section 35-1-67 is constitutionally deficient for failure to mandate additional hearings or require that specific time lines be met. We also reject its argument that the Act provides for inadequate review. As we noted above, workers' compensation claims are best viewed as a process, rather than as a discrete event.
We also reject Color Country's argument that the statute is unconstitutional because there is no provision for recoupment of money paid under an interim order that is later reversed. In Kerans v. Industrial Commission, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985), our supreme court ruled that an employer could not offset medical payments it had previously made for an employee's back injury that later turned out not to be compensable against an order to pay benefits based on the same employee's compensable neck injury. See id. at 54-55. Although the court did not rule on the constitutionality of this, nor was it raised, other courts from other jurisdictions have considered this precise question and have ruled that failure to provide a means for such a recoupment is not a violation of due process. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Duvall, 300 A.2d 732, 734 (N.H. 1973) (holding the New Hampshire Act did not provide for recoupment and that this was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment). Indeed, some states, as a result of employers obtaining stays during the sometimes lengthy appeals process, have enacted legislation specifically denying stays or providing for payment of workers' compensation benefits during appeal, and these provisions have also been held not to offend constitutional principles. See, e.g., McAvoy v. H.B. Sherman Co., 258 N.W.2d 414, 422 (Mich. 1977) (upholding provision that mandated paying 70% of award to employee during pendency of appeals); Merchants Mutual Ins. Co. v. Newport Hospital, 272 A.2d 329, 331 (R.I. 1971) (upholding statute with "no-stay" provision).
On balance, we conclude that the risk of erroneous deprivation of Color Country's property interest under the procedures of section 35-1-67 and UAPA is so minimal that the benefits of any additional procedures are outweighed by their admi
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