 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Wharton v. Earl Brown & Sons12/11/2001
from Washington residents, (4) arranged tournaments in Washington, (5) transported goods and supplies to these tournaments, (6) selected which Washington residents would be permitted to participate in the tournaments, and (7) sold bridge-related goods to Washington residents. Hartley, 61 Wn. App. at 606.
Brown relies on Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft and Banton v. Opryland U.S.A., Inc., 53 Wn. App. 409, 767 P.2d 584 (1989), overruled on other grounds by, Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 113 Wn.2d 763, 783 P.2d 78 (1989). In Crose, the court concluded general jurisdiction was proper because the defendant, an automobile manufacturer, exercised extensive control over its distributor, owned all of the stock of its importer, and conducted a well-organized, fully-integrated worldwide chain of distribution. Crose, 88 Wn.2d at 54-55. In contrast, the Banton court determined that general jurisdiction was not proper even though the defendant had made a sales presentation in Washington, paid commissions to travel brokers in Washington, occasionally broadcast music in Washington, received a Washington resident's check, and returned a confirmation of reservations for tickets and lodging in Nashville. Banton, 53 Wn. App. at 417-18.
Unlike the contacts demonstrated in Hein, Crose, and Hartley, Brown's contacts with Washington are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction. The Washington fruit growers that use Brown's services ship their goods to Brown in Oregon on consignment. Brown's relationship with G.G. Richardson was not continuous in nature. The fact that Brown's broker is located in Washington is insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction. And, the fact that Brown is registered as a foreign corporation is insufficient alone to establish general jurisdiction. Washington Equip. Mfg. Co. v. Concrete Placing Co., 85 Wn. App. 240, 244- 45, 931 P.2d 170 (1997).
In short, Mr. Wharton has failed to allege or demonstrate facts sufficient to permit a Washington court to assert general personal jurisdiction over Brown.
Specific Jurisdiction.
In the alternative, Mr. Wharton suggests that specific jurisdiction is proper under the long-arm statute, RCW 4.28.185. The long-arm statute permits the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that transacts business in this state if three requirements are met: (1) the nonresident corporation must purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in Washington; (2) the cause of action must arise from or be connected with that transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Washington Equip., 85 Wn. App. at 246 (citing requirements from Shute, 113 Wn.2d at 767).
Mr. Wharton contends specific jurisdiction exists because his cause of action arises from Brown's decision to select G.G. Richardson as the general contractor for the construction project in Oregon. Mr. Wharton points out that the contract between Brown and G.G. Richardson provides that the law of Washington would govern the agreement and that venue was proper in Chelan County. Schmitt Electric was not a party to this contract but did submit a proposal that was signed by Ronald E. Brown. In his affidavit, Mr. Brown states that all contracts were signed in Oregon, and that 'other than telephone calls to G. G. Richardson and possibly Schmitt Electric, all acts, construction, events and transactions' by Brown were done in the State of Oregon. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 28-29.
Purposeful availment requirement. To meet the first requirement, Mr. Wharton must show evidence that Br
Page 1 2 3 4 5 Washington Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|