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Wharton v. Earl Brown & Sons12/11/2001
ed the existence of agreements between Brown and G.G. Richardson, and Brown and Schmitt Electric, but Mr. Wharton presents no evidence as to how or where these agreements were solicited. Significantly, these agreements were for services to be performed in Oregon, where the agreements apparently were made. Although the agreement between Brown and G.G. Richardson contains a choice-of-law provision, this provision is only one factor tending to support the existence of minimum contacts. Kysar v. Lambert, 76 Wn. App. 470, 490, 887 P.2d 431 (1995).
Arising from requirement. Washington applies the 'but for' test to determine whether a claim against a nonresident corporation arises from or is connected with the solicitation of business in this state. Byron Nelson, 95 Wn. App. at 468. This test is met if the events giving rise to the claim would not have occurred 'but for' the business solicitation within this state. CTVC, 82 Wn. App. at 719.
Mr. Wharton must establish that the events giving rise to his claim would not have occurred 'but for' a purposeful act performed within this state. Some of the purposeful acts listed by Mr. Wharton do not relate to this cause of action. For example, Mr. Wharton's claim is not connected to any facts related to Brown's relationship with a fruit broker in Selah, Washington. The only relevant act is the agreement with G.G. Richardson containing the choice-of-law and forum clause, but there is no evidence that this agreement was solicited or signed in Washington. Of perhaps greater importance is that Brown apparently had a separate arrangement with Schmitt Electric. Hence, Mr. Wharton has failed to meet the 'but for' test.
Fair play and substantial justice.
The third factor to consider is whether the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction will offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In making this determination, courts consider the quality, nature, and extent of the defendant's activities in Washington, the relative convenience of the parties in maintaining an action here, the benefits and protection of Washington's laws afforded the parties, and the basic equities of the situation. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 113 Wn.2d 763, 767, 783 P.2d 78 (1989) (citing Deutsch v. West Coast Mach. Co., 80 Wn.2d 707, 711, 497 P.2d 1311 (1972)). Because Mr. Wharton has failed to establish the first two requirements necessary to establish specific jurisdiction, the exercise of jurisdiction here would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
We conclude the State of Washington lacked general and specific personal jurisdiction over Brown. For that reason, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Additionally, we reject Mr. Wharton's assignment of error challenging the trial court's decision to deny his request to take additional deposition testimony. Mr. Wharton has failed to include any argument related to this assignment of error. We will not consider assignments of error that are not supported with legal argument. Cyrus v. Martin, 64 Wn.2d 810, 813, 394 P.2d 369 (1964).
Affirm.
The majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
Kurtz, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
Schultheis, J.
Sweeney, J.
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